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ABSTRACT 
Algorithmic profiling technologies are impeding the economic security of 
low-income people in the United States. Based on their digital profiles, low-
income people are targeted for predatory marketing campaigns and financial 
products. At the same time, algorithmic decision-making can result in their 
exclusion from mainstream employment, housing, financial, health care, and 
educational opportunities. Government agencies are turning to algorithms to 
apportion social services, yet these algorithms lack transparency, leaving 
thousands of people adrift without state support and not knowing why. 
Marginalized communities are also subject to disproportionately high levels 
of surveillance, including facial recognition technology and the use of 
predictive policing software. 
American privacy law is no bulwark against these profiling harms, instead 
placing the onus of protecting personal data on individuals while leaving 
government and businesses largely free to collect, analyze, share, and sell 
personal data. By contrast, in the European Union, the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) gives EU residents numerous, enforceable 
rights to control their personal data. Spurred in part by the GDPR, Congress 
is debating whether to adopt comprehensive privacy legislation in the United 
States. This article contends that the GDPR contains several provisions that 
have the potential to limit digital discrimination against the poor, while 
enhancing their economic stability and mobility. The GDPR provides the 
following: (1) the right to an explanation about automated decision-making; 
(2) the right not to be subject to decisions based solely on automated 
profiling; (3) the right to be forgotten; (4) opportunities for public 
participation in data processing programs; and (5) robust implementation 
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and enforcement tools. The interests of low-income people must be part of 
privacy lawmaking, and the GDPR is a useful template for thinking about 
how to meet their data privacy needs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 18, 2018, citizens of the European Union awoke to a new, robust 
set of data privacy protections codified in the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), which gives them new levels of control over their 
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personal information.1 Meanwhile, Americans rise daily to the same 
fragmented privacy regime that has failed to forestall a drumbeat of data 
breaches, online misinformation campaigns, and a robust market in the sale 
of personal data, usually without their knowledge.2 For instance, in 2017, the 
credit reporting company Equifax disclosed that hackers had breached its 
servers and stolen the personal data of almost half the United States’s 
population.3 In 2018, we learned that Cambridge Analytica harvested the data 
of over 50 million Americans through personality quizzes on Facebook in 
order to target voters with political advertisements for the Trump campaign.4 
And, as consumers are bombarded with advertisements based on their 
internet searches or remarks captured by digital assistants such as Amazon’s 
Alexa, Americans are increasingly realizing that their online and offline 
behavior is being tracked and sold as part of a massive, networked data-for-
profit and surveillance system.5 
The American privacy regime is largely based on a notice and consent 
model that puts the onus on individuals to protect their own privacy.6 The 
model is not working. In the absence of congressional action, some states 
have enacted laws to protect the data privacy and/or security of their citizens.7 
California has enacted the most comprehensive statute, effective January 
2020, entitled the California Consumer Privacy Act, which expands 
transparency about the big data marketplace and gives consumers the right to 
opt-out of having their data sold to third parties.8 Other states may soon 
 
1. Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
2. See SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA 
353–55 (2018). 
3. Stacy Cowley, 2.5 Million More People Potentially Exposed in Equifax Breach, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/business/equifax-breach.html 
[https://perma.cc/8VWZ-L653]. 
4. Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump 
Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-
campaign.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/9LVD-9DAG]. 
5. Lee Rainie, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of Privacy 
Concerns, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-of-privacy-
concerns/ [https://perma.cc/8WLL-QL4Y]. 
6. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1880, 1882–83 (2013). 
7. State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 27, 2020), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-laws-
related-to-internet-privacy.aspx#Consumer [https://perma.cc/68V2-C338]. 
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2020). For more analysis of the California Consumer 
Privacy Act, see infra Part IV. 
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follow suit. After years of resistance, Big Tech companies such as Facebook, 
Google, Microsoft and Apple are now advocating for a national data 
protection law, primarily because they are worried about the emergence of 
varying state standards.9 Moreover, Big Tech is already working to comply 
with the GDPR for their millions of European consumers.10 In light of these 
new laws and the American public’s “techlash” against revelations of big data 
scandals,11 Congress is finally and seriously considering comprehensive 
privacy legislation.12 While the issue has bipartisan support, proposals vary 
in their solicitude for corporations versus consumers.13 As these issues are 
being actively debated, it is essential that the legislative process include the 
interests of all Americans, and not just elites and industry. 
Simply put, digital privacy needs are not the same for all Americans. 
Based on their digital profiles, low-income people are targeted with 
marketing campaigns for predatory products such as payday loans and for-
profit educational scams.14 At the same time, algorithmic decision-making 
can result in their exclusion from mainstream employment, housing, 
financial, and educational opportunities.15 Government agencies are turning 
to algorithms to apportion public benefits, yet these automated decision-
making systems lack transparency, leaving thousands of people adrift without 
state support and not knowing why.16 Marginalized communities are also 
subject to high levels of law enforcement surveillance, including the use of 
 
9. See, e.g., Ben Brody & Spencer Soper, Amazon Joins Tech Giants in Backing Federal 
Privacy Safeguards, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-26/amazon-joins-tech-giants-in-backing-
federal-privacy-safeguards [https://perma.cc/QTW7-ZC24]. 
10. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard, 
71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 389–91 (2019) (“All U.S. companies could either comply with the GDPR 
or cease offering sales and services to EU consumers.”). 
11. See Ben Zimmer, ‘Techlash’: Whipping Up Criticism of the Top Tech Companies, 
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/techlash-whipping-up-criticism-
of-the-top-tech-companies-11547146279 [https://perma.cc/5G42-GL2G]. 
12. See Cameron F. Kerry, Breaking Down Proposals for Privacy Legislation: How Do 
They Regulate?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/breaking-
down-proposals-for-privacy-legislation-how-do-they-regulate/ [https://perma.cc/6QXK-ZHSJ]. 
13. See id. (summarizing differences between proposed bills). 
14. See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA 
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016). 
15. See Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2013), 
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data-big-data-and-its-exclusions/ 
[https://perma.cc/L3XP-FXDR]; see also Matthew Desmond & Bruce Western, Poverty in 
America: New Directions and Debates, 44 ANN. REV. SOC. 305, 308 (2018) (describing how 
social exclusion is a form of deprivation). 
16. See generally Sarah Valentine, Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided Governments, 
Flawed Technologies, and Social Control, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 364 (2019). 
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predictive policing software, which relies on data profiling to target certain 
neighborhoods or people.17 These communities are also deeply concerned 
about facial recognition software, which is increasingly used by law 
enforcement and low-income housing developments.18 The internet 
experience is also different for low-income people than their more affluent 
counterparts, both in terms of how they access the internet and the advertising 
that is displayed to them.19 
These harms impede the economic security of low-income people, with 
ripple effects to other poverty-related deprivations, such as poor physical and 
mental health, family instability, threat of violence, environmental harms, 
low wages or lack of work, limited education, and inadequate living 
standards.20 Thus, data privacy is not only integral to values such as autonomy 
and dignity but also an important issue of economic justice—defined here as 
ensuring “that everyone has access to the material resources that create 
opportunities, in order to live a life unencumbered by pressing economic 
concerns.”21 
Although this article focuses on economic justice, it is impossible to 
discuss class issues without recognizing how economic subordination is 
 
17. See ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, 
RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017). 
18. See Tanvi Misra, The Tenants Fighting Back Against Facial Recognition Technology, 
CITYLAB (May 7, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/05/facial-recognition-tech-
surveillance-security-amazon-ring/588436/ [https://perma.cc/T4FB-BRSL]. 
19. Mary Madden, Michele E. Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice E. Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, 
and Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 57 
(2017); Michael Fertik, The Rich See a Different Internet than the Poor, SCI. AM. (Feb. 1, 2013), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/rich-see-different-internet-than-the-poor/ 
[https://perma.cc/8ZUY-H6FR]. 
20. See generally BRIAN GLASSMAN, MULTIDIMENSIONAL DEPRIVATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2017 (2019), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/demo/acs-40.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7JSQ-XFDM]. Among the six dimensions of poverty measured in the 
Multidimensional Deprivation Index, 37.1% of the United States population was deprived in one 
or more dimensions in 2017. Id. at 7. This is significantly higher than the 2017 official poverty 
measure based on the American Community Survey—which is based solely on income—of 
13.4%. Id. at 2. 
21. Sandro Galea, On Economic Justice, B.U. SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Jan. 29, 2017), 
https://www.bu.edu/sph/2017/01/29/on-economic-justice/ [https://perma.cc/JU48-7F2U]. 
Economic justice concerns include the “distribution of income, wealth, and opportunity,” 
“individual and group rights,” and “the relation of racial justice and gender justice to economic 
justice.” Louise Simmons, Economic Justice, OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. WORK (Mar. 2017), 
https://oxfordre.com/socialwork/socialwork/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199975839.001.0001/a
crefore-9780199975839-e-1266 [https://perma.cc/NMA5-KYGX] (discussing various realms of 
economic justice). 
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linked to race, gender, disability, LGBTQ status, and other intersectional 
identities. Low socio-economic status is deeply intertwined with these 
attributes as a result of histories of discrimination and marginalization. At the 
same time, people who suffer poverty in America are a diverse and varied 
group of people, each with their own narratives, strengths, and challenges.22 
Still, as a group, low-income people share vulnerabilities to data privacy 
deprivations, which in turn pose a barrier to economic stability.23 This article 
focuses on that common experience. 
Given the rise of digital profiling and artificial intelligence, it is useful and 
timely to consider whether existing privacy laws such as the GDPR serve the 
needs of economically marginalized people in ways that should be 
incorporated into United States law. This article argues that while the GDPR 
is not a panacea, it contains provisions that have the potential to limit digital 
discrimination against the poor, while enhancing their economic stability and 
mobility. As a piece of legislation, the GDPR does not contain tools to 
dismantle oppressive structures within the economy and society that 
technology magnifies,24 but it does enhance transparency and accountability, 
which in turn can serve social justice movements. With greater knowledge of 
and control over personal data flows, Americans can consider other 
substantive privacy interventions that might be necessary to advance 
economic justice, such as limitations on targeted advertising, facial 
recognition technology, workplace surveillance, and the like. Moreover, 
American corporations are already working on compliance with these 
statutes,25 and in the EU, governments are busy enforcing the GDPR.26 Thus, 
these provisions are within the realm of the possible and the practical. The 
 
22. See JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE 
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 20–21 (2001) (describing demographic, political, physical, and regional 
variations among poor people); see also FRANK MUNGER, LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW 
ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, LOW-WAGE WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 20 
(Frank Munger ed., 2002) (asserting the importance of seeing and understanding the poor as 
individuals with their own narratives). 
23. For excellent analysis of how cyberspace technologies intersect with race, see generally 
RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE 
(2019) and SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES 
REINFORCE RACISM (2018). 
24. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. 613, 620 (2019) (explaining how algorithmic decision-making “represents a 
radical shift in the discourse of power.”). Waldman adds that “algorithmic decision-making 
represents a distinctly neoliberal form of policy making” that enshrines values of efficiency and 
innovation over values “like fairness, nondiscrimination, and human rights.” Id. at 624. 
25. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 365. 
26. See, e.g., GDPR Fines and Penalties, NATHAN TR. (Feb. 23, 2020), 
https://www.nathantrust.com/gdpr-fines-penalties [https://perma.cc/5NRA-BXAF]. 
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GDPR is providing momentum for national legislation currently being 
debated in Congress.27 For political and cultural reasons, it is unlikely 
Congress will enact any law that is more protective of consumer interests than 
the GDPR. Thus, the GDPR is a viable text for thinking about how to shore 
up privacy for our most vulnerable communities, and it deserves extended 
analysis and consideration from this perspective. 
Part I describes the class differential in data privacy harms, explaining 
how low-income people are susceptible to both unfair targeting and exclusion 
based on their data profiles, as well as heightened social control through 
surveillance. Mapping the landscape of digital privacy harms facing 
marginalized groups is essential to bringing their experiences into 
lawmaking. Part II explains why America’s current data privacy legal regime, 
which centers on a notice and consent model, is woefully inadequate to 
protect the privacy of Americans, with particularly harsh consequences for 
low-income people. Part III analyzes five provisions in the GDPR that have 
the potential to advance economic justice if similar provisions are enacted at 
a federal level in the United States, or even in individual states.28 These 
provisions are as follows: (1) the right to an explanation about automated 
decision-making; (2) the right not to be subject to decisions based on solely 
automated profiling; (3) the right to be forgotten; (4) public participation in 
data processing programs; and (5) robust implementation and enforcement 
tools. Part IV considers how the California Consumer Privacy Act compares 
to the GDPR in terms of economic justice objectives. While data privacy has 
been aptly recognized as a civil rights issue,29 this article contends that data 
 
27. See Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771, 773 
(2019) (“The EU has taken an essential role in shaping how the world thinks about data privacy.”); 
see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW 50–51 (2019) 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45631.pdf [https://perma.cc/84W6-VTQX]; cf. Anupam Chander, 
Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020), 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3208&context=facpub 
[https://perma.cc/VM7V-UXLH] (arguing that the California law is catalyzing privacy law across 
the United States). 
28. Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information 
Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1063 (2019) (noting that some states “have already 
begun to emulate certain aspects of the GDPR”). 
29. See Letter from Access Humbolt et al., to Sen. Roger Wicker et al., (Feb. 13, 2019), 
https://www.democraticmedia.org/sites/default/files/field/public-files/2019/letter_to_congress_o 
n_civil_rights_and_privacy_2-13-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HSN-FBUY] (writing “to ensure that 
civil rights retain a fundamental place in the ongoing privacy debate”); Becky Chao, Eric Null & 
Brandi Collins-Dexter, Centering Civil Rights in the Privacy Debate, NEW AM. (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/centering-civil-rights-privacy-debate/ 
[https://perma.cc/W52Z-TJ2C]; Aaron Rieke & Corrine Yu, Discrimination’s Digital Frontier, 
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privacy is also an economic justice issue, and that both frames are essential 
for enacting laws that benefit marginalized communities. The GDPR contains 
mechanisms to combat illegal discrimination as well as to move towards a 
substantive vision of economic justice. 
II. THE CLASS DIFFERENTIAL IN DATA PRIVACY HARMS 
At all hours of the day, and deep into the night, our data is being harvested, 
aggregated, and sold.30 Businesses generate immense profits from this mining 
of big data, making use of our buying habits, social relationships, political 
preferences, lifestyle, hobbies, health, and personality.31 The data extraction 
industry relies on a wide range of sources, such as public records, web 
browsing activity, emails, banking activity, social media, store loyalty cards, 
online quizzes, license plate readers, app usage, smart devices (such as fitness 
watches and internet-connected doorbells), and geo-location tracking on our 
smartphones.32 “Increasingly, the market sees you from within, measuring 
your body and emotional states, and watching as you move around your 
house, the office, or the mall.”33 Data brokers combine and cross-reference 
the “different sources of information they’ve bought and acquired, and then 
create a single detailed file on you: a data profile of your digital shadow.”34 
Data brokers sell these profiles to eager purchasers, including marketers and 
 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/facebook-
targeted-marketing-perpetuates-discrimination/587059/ [https://perma.cc/7HJR-FW4U]. 
30. See IGO, supra note 2, at 355; Geoffrey A. Fowler, It’s the Middle of the Night. Do You 
Know Who Your iPhone Is Talking to?, WASH. POST (May 28, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/28/its-middle-night-do-you-know-who-
your-iphone-is-talking/ [https://perma.cc/BZ83-VZLV]. 
31. See Wolfie Christl, Corporate Surveillance in Everyday Life, CRACKED LABS (June 
2017), https://crackedlabs.org/en/corporate-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/JEY5-LWHV]; 
Jeremy B. Merrill, How to Wrestle Your Data From Data Brokers, Silicon Valley—and 
Cambridge Analytica, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-to-
wrestle-your-data-from-data-brokers-silicon-valley-and-cambridge-analytica 
[https://perma.cc/FK3J-RK7X]. 
32. FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-
transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY66-56VQ]; Stuart A. Thompson & 
Charlie Warzel, Opinion, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-cell-
phone.html [https://perma.cc/5YDZ-WU6G] (reporting on the ease of matching billions of 
location data points originating from a single data location company with specific individuals). 
33. Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Seeing Like a Market, 15 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 9, 23 
(2017). 
34. HANNAH FRY, HELLO WORLD, BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ALGORITHMS 32 (2018). 
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retailers, law enforcement, financial companies, educational institutions, 
employers, and government agencies, who then use the data for their own 
purposes.35 Big Tech companies such as Amazon, Google, and Facebook are 
also mining their consumers’ data and selling access to this information trove 
to advertisers.36 In addition, almost every major industry is using their 
customer’s data to integrate with these data networks in order to expand their 
profits.37 Government agencies both sell and purchase their citizens’ personal 
data, thus blurring the distinction between public and private harms and 
remedies. 
There is a longstanding tension between Americans’ desire for privacy and 
the “free” services provided by social media and search engines.38 A Pew 
survey on social media usage found that ninety-one percent of Americans are 
concerned about lacking control over their personal information.39 And yet, 
only one in ten Facebook users exited the platform after learning about the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal.40 For many people, it appears that the harms 
of the surveillance economy do not rise beyond a sense of creepiness at being 
followed around the web by ads for products they briefly perused online. This 
apathy is slowly changing, however, as Americans learn more about the 
consequences of their data collection. For instance, while most Americans 
remain on Facebook, many are changing their online behavior, some are 
 
35. Id. at 31; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 32. 
36. See FRY, supra note 34, at 36; Steve Lohr, Calls Mount To Ease Big Tech’s Grip on 
Your Data, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/business/calls-
mount-to-ease-big-techs-grip-on-your-data.html [https://perma.cc/V4L8-SEN6]; Angela 
Moscaritolo, What Does Big Tech Know About You? Basically Everything, PC MAG (Apr. 8, 
2020), https://www.pcmag.com/news/366327/what-does-big-tech-know-about-you-basically-
everything [https://perma.cc/U5ND-6X2S]; The Rise of Data Capital, MIT TECH. REV. CUSTOM 
& ORACLE (2016), http://files.technologyreview.com/whitepapers/MIT_Oracle+Report-
The_Rise_of_Data_Capital.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XDG-URQY]. 
37. See Christl, supra note 31. 
38. Max Eddy, Online Data Protection 101: Don’t Let Big Tech Get Rich Off Your Info, PC 
MAG (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.pcmag.com/news/online-data-protection-101-dont-let-big-
tech-get-rich-off-your-info [https://perma.cc/2CBC-MAZE]. 
39. See Rainie, supra note 5. 
40. Chris Raymond, So What Do You Think of Facebook Now?, CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 15, 
2019), https://www.consumerreports.org/social-media/what-do-you-think-of-facebook-now-
survey/ [https://perma.cc/4PT3-4CVW]. Even when people exit Facebook—or never engage with 
it in the first place—it maintains “shadow profiles” on them. See Russell Brandom, Shadow 
Profiles Are the Biggest Flaw in Facebook’s Privacy Defense, VERGE (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/11/17225482/facebook-shadow-profiles-zuckerberg-
congress-data-privacy [https://perma.cc/Q3T8-7F27]; Sarah Jeong, I Tried Leaving Facebook. I 
Couldn’t, VERGE (Apr. 28, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/28/17293056/facebook-
deletefacebook-social-network-monopoly [https://perma.cc/HA2G-686G]. 
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actively subverting surveillance technologies,41 and large majorities believe 
we need stronger legal protections for our data.42 
The need for greater legal protections is particularly acute for low-income 
people, 43 who pay the highest price for our surveillance economy. We live in 
“a data environment . . . in which individuals are constantly surveyed and 
evaluated, categorized and grouped, rated and ranked, numbered and 
quantified, included or excluded, and as a result, treated differently.”44 In one 
sense, this is nothing new—poor people have been stigmatized and surveilled 
for centuries.45 However, technology is hyper-charging this dynamic, while 
simultaneously obscuring the structural disadvantages that oppress low-
income populations.46 The big data ecosystem and its algorithmic outputs, 
along with a corresponding lack of privacy protections, undermine economic 
justice for marginalized people in at least three overarching and intersecting 
ways, subjecting them to digital discrimination and electronic exploitation; 
inaccuracies; and surveillance.47 
 
41. See, e.g., Elise Thomas, How To Hack Your Face To Dodge the Rise of Facial 
Recognition Tech, WIRED (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/avoid-facial-
recognition-software [https://perma.cc/VP6N-9R78]; Malia Wollan, How To Thwart Facial 
Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/magazine/how-
to-thwart-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/GSS7-WG9A]. 
42. See Raine, supra note 5. 
43. This article defines the words “low-income” and “poverty” and “low socio-economic 
status” to mean people living under “economic deprivation”—or lack of economic resources with 
attendant negative social consequences—without endorsing any particular method of measuring 
poverty. See JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA: A HANDBOOK 23 (3d ed. 2013) (defining 
poverty). The United States uses an absolute measure in calculating the official poverty line (i.e., 
it is based on a needs standard that is constant over time), whereas relative measures are based on 
comparative disadvantage, fluctuating over time. Id. at 23–24. Under federal government 
measures, the poverty line is generally a lower financial threshold than the standards used to 
define low-income. See Alicia Mazzara & Barbara Sard, Chart Book: Employment and Earnings 
for Households Receiving Federal Rental Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 
5, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/chart-book-employment-and-earnings-for-
households-receiving-federal-rental#_ftn5 [https://perma.cc/9XYL-JWLC]. On the various 
methods of measuring poverty and their controversies and merits, see generally ICELAND, supra 
at ch. 3. 
44. See Christl, supra note 31. 
45. See VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, 
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 14–38 (2018); Wendy A. Bach, Prosecuting Poverty, 
Criminalizing Care, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 809, 818–20 (2019). 
46. EUBANKS, supra note 45, at 33–37; IGO, supra note 2, at 357 (“What gives the current 
moment its special urgency is a uniquely combustible combination: a deluge of volunteered or 
solicited personal information, on the one hand, and the increasingly sophisticated capacities of 
other parties for linking, sharing, and acting on it, on the other.”). 
47. There are numerous, serious other big data harms and technological privacy intrusions 
outside the scope of this article, such as immigration surveillance, online targeting of women in 
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A. Digital Discrimination/Electronic Exploitation 
People with low socio-economic status face both digital discrimination 
and economic exploitation when businesses and government use 
technological tools to target them for unfair products and services or to 
exclude them from mainstream opportunities. These tools add scope, scale, 
and speed to long-standing economic vulnerabilities. Algorithmic decision-
making,48 or computerized analysis of large data sets to infer correlations, is 
fueling these patterns of targeting and exclusion, thus making it harder for 
low-income people to move up the economic ladder.49 Employers use 
algorithms to decide who to target with job postings, who to interview, and 
who to hire.50 Landlords use tenant screening reports generated by algorithms 
to assess who is likely to pay their rent on time.51 Colleges use algorithms to 
identify applicants who are most likely to attend and to stay in school.52 
Government social service agencies use algorithms to determine program 
eligibility and track recipients’ compliance.53 Law enforcement agencies use 
algorithms to predict criminal hot spots and identify suspects.54 The criminal 
justice system uses algorithms to determine bail on the front end and 
sentencing on the back end.55 While these examples can all encompass 
legitimate societal objectives, inequities arise when algorithms reinforce 
 
ways that threaten their personal safety, and online disinformation campaigns. In addition, poor 
people suffer greater injuries resulting from data breaches, and thus benefit from enhanced 
cybersecurity efforts and enforcement. See Sarah Dranoff, Identity Theft: A Low-Income Issue, 
A.B.A. (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_services/publications/dialogue/volume/17/winter-
2014/identity-theft--a-lowincome-issue/ [https://perma.cc/2PNX-FYVM]. 
48. Some algorithms are rule-based, meaning they are human constructed and “direct and 
unambiguous,” such as an automated decision tree. FRY, supra note 34, at 10. Other algorithms 
are used in machine learning (a form of artificial intelligence or AI), which “refers to an automated 
process of discovering correlations . . . between variables in a dataset, often to make predictions 
or estimates of some outcome.” David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal 
Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 671 (2017). 
49. Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1026–27 (2017) 
(examples of discrimination); Id. at 1036–39 (means by which discrimination operates 
unintentionally in algorithms). 
50. See Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 530–33 
(2018). 
51. James A. Allen, The Color of Algorithms: An Analysis and Proposed Research Agenda 
for Deterring Algorithmic Redlining, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 219, 251–53 (2019). 
52. Madden et al., supra note 19, at 98–103. 
53. Valentine, supra note 16, at 370–71. 
54. FRY, supra note 34, at 154–59; Emily Berman, A Government of Laws and Not of 
Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1293 (2018); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic 
Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1049–50, 1068–72 (2019). 
55. Huq, supra note 54, at 1072–76. 
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divides in economic status or result in discrimination against marginalized 
groups. 
Employment. There are numerous examples of algorithms that 
discriminated against people who are protected under anti-discrimination 
civil rights laws.56 For instance, Amazon tested a hiring algorithm for 
technical jobs that turned out to be biased against women.57 The programmers 
fed data into the algorithm culled from Amazon’s prior ten years of resumes, 
which were predominated by white males. The algorithm then linked the 
traits on those resumes to predictions about future success, thereby 
disfavoring resumes that contained words associated with women.58 
Similarly, a study that tested Google’s ad platform created a simulation that 
found that ads related to career coaching for high paid executive positions 
were funneled more frequently to men than women, although the cause was 
unclear.59 It “might have resulted unintentionally from algorithms optimizing 
click-through rates or other metrics free of bigotry.”60 
In legal terms, this may have been a case of disparate impact, or the 
differential treatment of certain groups based on neutral criteria.61 In practical 
terms, it means that women may continue to suffer from a gender pay gap 
that leaves them disproportionately underpaid compared to men, which 
 
56. Federal laws prohibit discrimination on the on the basis of race, color, national origin, 
religion, age, gender, pregnancy, veteran’s status, genetic information, and physical or mental 
disability. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2018). Some state laws protect additional groups. See 
EEO Protected Classes by State and Municipality, XPERTHR, https://www.xperthr.com/fifty-
state-charts/eeo-protected-classes-by-state-and-municipality/9953/ [https://perma.cc/P6NN-
NW2Y]. 
57. Nicol Turner Lee, Paul Resnick & Genie Barton, Algorithmic Bias Detection and 
Mitigation: Best Practices and Policies To Reduce Consumer Harms, BROOKINGS (May 22, 
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-
practices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-harms/#footref-10 [https://perma.cc/XY6N-HGGL]. 
58. Id. Amazon is 60% male and 74% of managers are male. Id. The company says it did 
not implement the hiring tool. Id.; see also Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting 




59. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz & Anupam Datta, Automated Experiments on Ad 
Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity, Choice, and Discrimination, 1 PROC. ON PRIVACY 
ENHANCING TECHS. 92 (2015), http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/danupam/dtd-pets15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q4AU-6B2E]. 
60. Id. at 105. 
61. On the difference between disparate impact and disparate treatment theories in 
discrimination law, see Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: 
From Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L.J 559, 564–
69 (2017). 
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contributes to the feminization of poverty, or higher rates of poverty among 
women.62 Another example comes from a hiring algorithm designed to 
predict employee tenure; it found the single best predictor of tenure was 
distance between home and work,63 a factor that was highly correlated with 
race.64 In turn, racial discrimination in employment compounds the racial 
wealth gap and perpetuates disproportionate poverty for African-
Americans.65 “Since many social patterns related to education and work 
reflect troubled legacies of racism, sexism, and other forms of socioeconomic 
disadvantage, blindly replicating those patterns via software will only 
perpetuate and exacerbate historical disparities.”66 
In 2019, Facebook settled five lawsuits brought by civil rights 
organizations and individuals alleging that it permitted housing, job, and loan 
companies to micro-target advertisements on Facebook’s platform to certain 
groups.67 Among the alleged wrongdoing, Facebook’s ad system excluded 
 
62. See ICELAND, supra note 43, at 99–100; Michele E. Gilman, En-Gendering Economic 
Inequality, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 9–13 (2016). 
63. Joseph Walker, Meet the New Boss: Big Data, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 20, 2012), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443890304578006252019616768 
[https://perma.cc/SM69-6YD8]. The company dropped that variable. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See Brentin Mock, Why Can’t We Close the Racial Wealth Gap?, CITYLAB (Mar. 21, 
2019), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/03/racial-wealth-gap-income-inequality-black-
white-households/585325/ [https://perma.cc/35V6-SPFC] (reporting on a study of how the racial 
income gap feeds the racial wealth gap); Thomas Shapiro, Tatjana Meschede & Sam Osoro, The 
Roots of the Widening Racial Wealth Gap: Explaining the Black-White Economic Divide, INST. 
ON ASSETS & SOC. POL’Y (2013), https://heller.brandeis.edu/iasp/pdfs/racial-wealth-
equity/racial-wealth-gap/roots-widening-racial-wealth-gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG2Z-AQUF]. 
66. MIRANDA BOGEN & AARON RIEKE, HELP WANTED: AN EXAMINATION OF HIRING 





67. Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Agrees To Overhaul Targeted Advertising 




[https://perma.cc/G2X7-V536]. ProPublica reporting uncovered the micro-targeting. Julia 
Angwin & Terry Parris, Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 
28, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisers-exclude-users-by-race 
[https://perma.cc/R8XD-WY58]; Julia Angwin, Ariana Tobin & Madeleine Varner, Facebook 
(Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-advertising-discrimination-housing-race-sex-
national-origin [https://perma.cc/KF62-8WVL]; Julia Angwin, Noam Scheiber & Ariana Tobin, 
Dozens of Companies Are Using Facebook To Exclude Older Workers from Job Ads, 
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people with a certain “ethnic affinity” from seeing housing ads68 and excluded 
women from viewing job postings that employers wanted targeted to men, 
such as Uber drivers, truck drivers, and roofers.69 To offer this targeted 
advertising, Facebook classified people into more than 50,000 categories 
such as “English as a second language,” “disabled parking permit,” or 
“Telemundo.”70 
Under the terms of the settlement,71 Facebook’s advertisers will no longer 
be able to target people based on sensitive categories such as age, gender, zip 
code, or race. However, a study found that advertising discrimination on 
Facebook persists post-settlement apparently because the modified 
algorithms target viewers based on proxy variables and ad content.72 
Moreover, targeting by income is not prohibited under the settlement,73 just 
as poverty is not a protected class under discrimination law.74 This legal gap 
magnifies economic inequality. People click on certain ads, while skipping 
others, due to “deep-seated social inequities: the neighborhood they live in, 
where they went to school, how much money they have. An ad system that is 
designed to maximize clicks, and to maximize profits for Facebook, will 
naturally reinforce these social inequities and so serve as a barrier to equal 
opportunity.”75 
 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-ads-age-
discrimination-targeting [https://perma.cc/FE9A-9QRV]. 
68. See Jan & Dwoskin, supra note 67. 
69. See Nitasha Tiku, ACLU Says Facebook Ads Let Employers Favor Men over Women, 
WIRED (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/aclu-says-facebook-ads-let-employers-
favor-men-over-women/ [https://perma.cc/WM35-KEBZ]. 
70. See Jan & Dwoskin, supra note 67. Facebook is facing a separate class action lawsuit 
alleging age and gender discrimination in the financial advertising it serves on its platform. See 
John Detrixhe & Jeremy B. Merrill, The Fight Against Financial Advertisers Using Facebook for 
Digital Redlining, QUARTZ (Nov. 1, 2019), https://qz.com/1733345/the-fight-against-
discriminatory-financial-ads-on-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/A69L-VSS2]. 
71. For the settlement agreement of claims brought by housing advocates, see Settlement 
Agreement and Release Between National Fair Housing Alliance et al., and Facebook, NAT’L 
FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE (Mar. 28, 2019), https://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/FINAL-SIGNED-NFHA-FB-Settlement-Agreement-
00368652x9CCC2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7G7-V2FJ] [hereinafter Settlement Agreement]. 
72. Piotr Sapiezynski et al., Algorithms that “Don’t See Color”: Comparing Biases in 
Lookalike and Special Ad Audiences (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.07579.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3L7C-8RLT]. 
73. Targeting by source of lawful income is prohibited under the settlement. Settlement 
Agreement, supra note 71. 
74. Danieli Evans Peterman, Socioeconomic Status Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV. 1283, 
1291–92, 1300 (2018). 
75. Rieke & Yu, supra note 29. 
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Education. Big data is used not only to discriminate among groups but 
also to exploit marginalized groups. Poverty has many causes; it “is not 
simply the byproduct of one’s attributes or historical outcomes but is also 
actively produced through unequal relationships between the financially 
secure and insecure.”76 An exploitative relationship is exemplified in the for-
profit higher educational field, where “lead generation” websites 
surreptitiously gather information about potential students when people 
conduct web searches for terms such as welfare benefits.77 The lead 
generators target low-income people and veterans and then sell their personal 
data to for-profit colleges, who subsequently apply deceptive and strong-
armed marketing tactics to potential students, encouraging them to take out 
massive loans to enroll.78 At these for-profit colleges, students often assume 
crippling debt with few job prospects and low graduation rates.79 
Within the non-profit college landscape, some colleges use tracking 
software to collect and analyze data on high school students who visit their 
admissions websites (without the students’ knowledge).80 Algorithms then 
identify which students are most likely to attend and pay full tuition rates.81 
When admission offices use these algorithms to focus on affluent students, 
underprivileged high school students may end up excluded from recruiting 
efforts. Algorithms provide increased opportunities for economic 
segmentation. 
Financial Services. Another example of data exploitation arises in the 
financial services setting. Online lead generation is steering low-income, 
predominantly African-American consumers to high-interest payday loans.82 
These ads are able to reach consumers even in states where payday lending 
 
76. Desmond & Western, supra note 15, at 310. 
77. See U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GRP. & CTR. FOR DIG. DEMOCRACY, PRIVATE FOR-
PROFIT COLLEGES AND ONLINE LEAD GENERATION: PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES USE DIGITAL 





79. See Maura Dundon, Students or Consumers? For-Profit Colleges and the Practical and 
Theoretical Role of Consumer Protection, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 376–77 (2015). 
80. Douglas MacMillan & Nick Anderson, Student Tracking, Secret Scores: How College 
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is unlawful.83 One lead generator provides payday loan companies with 
highly segmented lists that identify “consumers who are struggling to make 
their bills and are looking for fast quick cash.”84 Payday loans are financially 
harmful because they charge high interest rates that are difficult for low-
income borrowers to pay back, thus placing them in an endless loop of high-
interest borrowing to cover existing loans.85 Moreover, the industry is rife 
with lax data security.86 The market in consumer data propels this consumer 
exploitation. 
In the mainstream financial market, credit scores are used to determine the 
costs of borrowing money, and they are incorporated into reports used by the 
gatekeepers to housing, employment, professional licensing, and education.87 
Thus, a low score can depress economic mobility,88 and certain groups within 
society predictably have lower scores. “A good credit score is usually a proxy 
for wealth, and wealth is a good proxy for race and national origin.”89 Further, 
many minorities are “credit invisible”—due to generations of discrimination 
by banks, they have avoided mainstream financial services altogether and 
thus do not generate the sort of information that feeds a credit score.90 
Members of this “lumpenscoretariat” have economic lives outside the formal 
economy.91 
Given these dynamics, there are concerns that mainstream credit scoring 
models exclude alternate data points that could assist minorities in obtaining 
 
83. Id.; Comments of Alvaro Bedoya and Clare Garvie, Center on Privacy & Technology at 
Georgetown Law, on “Follow the Lead: An FTC Workshop on Lead Generation,” FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION (Dec. 18, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/12/00017-99877.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q8YU-4SHM] [hereinafter Bedoya & Garvie]. 
84. Bedoya & Garvie, supra note 83. 
85. See UPTURN, supra note 82. 
86. Id. 
87. See Vlad A. Hertza, Fighting Unfair Classifications in Credit Reporting: Should the 
United States Adopt GDPR-Inspired Rights in Regulating Consumer Credit?, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1707, 1713 (2018); Lea Shepard, Toward a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm, 
53 B.C. L. REV. 1695, 1696 (2012). 
88. Shepard, supra note 87, at 1734. 
89. Hertza, supra note 87, at 1727. 
90. See Lori T. Yearwood, Many Minorities Avoid Seeking Credit due to Generations of 
Discrimination. Why That Keeps Them Back, CNBC (Sept. 1, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/01/many-minorities-avoid-seeking-credit-due-to-decades-of-
discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/6YHZ-EFDX] (“Decades of discrimination by the federal 
government and America’s financial institutions has induced an almost trauma-like response, 
causing many people of color, particularly African-Americans, to adopt self-protective behavior 
not unlike a post-traumatic stress reaction.”). 
91. Fourcade & Healy, supra note 33, at 19. In the cloud economy, “Those who are invisible 
are of little use.” Id. 
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better credit terms, such as utility and rental payments, while instead relying 
upon traditional data points that magnify existing disparities in access to 
“high-quality education, well-paying jobs, and affordable loans.”92 At the 
same time, there is caution that alternative data points might “be designed to 
identify and target vulnerable individuals with high-cost loan products.”93 
Without careful design and oversight, both traditional and alternative credit 
rating models raise the risk that affordable credit will remain out of reach for 
low-income consumers. 
Housing. Automated decision-making by lenders is associated with higher 
mortgage rates for Black and Latino borrowers as compared to similarly 
situated white borrowers.94 Although the disparity is lower for fintech 
mortgages than for traditional mortgages, this finding contradicts claims that 
algorithms eliminate discrimination.95 All told, Black and Latino borrowers 
are paying up to three quarters of a billion dollars more in mortgage interest 
each year.96 Given the links between wealth accumulation and 
homeownership, this mortgage disparity further drives the racial wealth gap.97 
In the rental market, many landlords are screening tenants with 
algorithmically generated reports purchased from tenant screening 
companies. A fair housing lawsuit is pending in Connecticut against a tenant 
 
92. See Shepard, supra note 87, at 1731. 
93. Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. 
& TECH. 148, 167 (2017). 
94. Aaron Glantz & Emmanuel Martinez, Kept Out: For People of Color, Banks Are 
Shutting the Door to Homeownership, REVEAL (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.revealnews.org/article/for-people-of-color-banks-are-shutting-the-door-to-
homeownership/ [https://perma.cc/555W-6E78]. 
95. Emily Badger, Who’s To Blame When Algorithms Discriminate?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/upshot/housing-discrimination-algorithms-
hud.html [https://perma.cc/6HWR-YDKV] (describing the research of law professor Myron 
Orfield, who states that “[a] black household that makes $167,000 is less likely to qualify for a 
prime loan [for a mortgage] than a white household that makes $40,000”); Robert Bartlett et al., 
Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era 6 (Nov. 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/morse/research/papers/discrim.pdf?_ga=2.106485891.10353701
51.1559599414-527767480.1559599414 [https://perma.cc/X7YN-VHXC]; Glantz & Martinez, 
supra note 94 (reporting that an analysis of thirty-one million records showed minorities were 
charged mortgage loans at higher rates than their white counterparts in sixty-one metro areas 
“even when controlling for applicants’ income, loan amount and neighborhood”). 
96. Bartlett et al., supra note 95, at 5. The study found that the fintech lenders discriminated 
less than face-to-face lenders in terms of accepting minority applications. Id. at 6. This is a good 
example of automated decision overcoming human biases. 
97. Glantz & Martinez, supra note 94. HUD is proposing new regulations that would limit 
the ability to challenge algorithmic screening used by landlords. See Badger, supra note 95. 
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screening company that incorporates criminal record data in its reports.98 The 
plaintiffs allege that this practice reflects and compounds the effects of high 
levels of policing in minority neighborhoods.99 Indeed, screening tools that 
include criminal record data disproportionately impact African Americans 
and Hispanics (even though whites engage in similar rates of criminal 
behavior), and reliance on these reports can leave people homeless or reduced 
to living in substandard housing.100 The problem is compounded when, as in 
the Connecticut case, the creator of the algorithm refuses to reveal 
information about the source or details of the underlying criminal history 
records, making it impossible for a landlord to consider—or a tenant to 
challenge—whether the supposed criminal conduct at issue should be 
disqualifying.101 
Health Care. Health care analytics based on personal data can help guide 
patient diagnosis and treatment, but they can also lead to digital 
discrimination.102 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 
or HIPAA, aims to protect patient privacy by preventing health care providers 
from unauthorized use or disclosure of patients’ medical data.103 However, 
HIPAA permits health care providers to share patient data with business 
associates, and this means that Google can partner with Ascension, a health 
care chain operating in twenty-one states, in order to collect and analyze the 
health data of millions of Ascension patients without the knowledge or 
consent of the patients or their doctors.104 This partnership is raising concerns 
 
98. Mark Pazniokas, A Tenant Blacklist, Compiled by Algorithm, CONN. MIRROR (Mar. 28, 
2019), https://ctmirror.org/2019/03/28/a-tenant-blacklist-compiled-by-algorithm/ 
[https://perma.cc/CJ58-H43U]. 
99. See id. 
100. See Arroyo v. Corelogic, NAT’L HOUSING L. PROJECT (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.nhlp.org/our-initiatives/arroyo-v-corelogic/ [https://perma.cc/ZF79-B37T]. 
101. See Pazniokas, supra note 98. 
102. See generally Alvin Rajkomar et al., Ensuring Fairness in Machine Learning To 
Advance Health Equity, 169 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 866 (2018); Linda Nordling, A Fairer Way 
Forward for AI in Health Care, NATURE (Sept. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02872-2 [https://perma.cc/9MXP-RWNT]; 
Mohana Ravindranath, How Your Health Information Is Sold and Turned into ‘Risk Scores,’ 
POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/03/health-risk-scores-opioid-
abuse-1139978 [https://perma.cc/CW4U-J6AG]. 
103. Sharona Hoffman, What Genetic Testing Teaches About Predictive Health Analytics 
Regulation, 98 N.C. L. REV. 123, 144 (2019). 
104. Rob Copeland, Google’s ‘Project Nightingale’ Gathers Personal Health Data on 
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about the security of patient data in light of prior data leaks at Google, as well 
as how the data will be used, and possibly monetized.105 
HIPAA’s scope is also limited because much health care data exists 
outside the scope of covered entities, such as data generated from website 
searches, social media platforms, app usage, and fitness trackers.106 There are 
data brokers that gather this information and then sell “sick lists” to 
companies that in turn use the information to market products to 
consumers.107 For instance, one list of 4.7 million people is called “suffering 
seniors,” and it includes people over fifty-five who supposedly suffer from 
illnesses such as Alzheimer’s disease and depression.108 Data brokers also sell 
health profiles to insurers, who can then combine these profiles with 
electronic medical records and other data sets to make predictions about 
patient health.109 In one cautionary tale, a woman was denied insurance 
because her prescription history revealed she was taking antidepressants.110 
There are companies that are generating risk scores based on health data and 
selling those scores to doctors, insurers, and hospitals.111 The market in 
predictive health data is particularly pernicious for poor people, who have 
higher rates of illnesses than the general population, and may thus face higher 
insurance and borrowing rates, along with greater employer unwillingness to 
 
105. Katherine Bindley, Your Health Data Isn’t as Safe as You Think, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 
22, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-health-data-isnt-as-safe-as-you-think-
11574418606 [https://perma.cc/B9RQ-ER76]. 
106. See Hoffman, supra note 103, at 135; Frank Pasquale & Tara A. Ragone, Protecting 
Health Privacy in an Era of Big Data Processing and Cloud Computing, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 
595, 637 (2014) (“So many online activities have some implications about a person’s health status 
that access to medical records is not necessary to construct a medical reputation.”); Nicolas P. 
Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV. 385, 405–06 (2012). 
107. Aimee Picchi, The Creepy Side of Data Mining: Selling “Sick” Lists, CBS NEWS (Sept. 
11, 2014), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-creepy-side-of-data-mining-selling-sick-lists/ 
[https://perma.cc/PGD6-AWD5]. 
108. Id. 
109. Max N. Helveston, Reining in Commercial Exploitation of Consumer Data, 123 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 667, 673 (2019) (“[T]he aggregation of massive amounts of consumers’ personal data 
and advancements in AI-driven algorithmic learning have made it possible to derive almost 
limitless correlations between individual characteristics and risk.”); Sharona Hoffman, Big Data 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 780–84 (2017); Marshall Allen, 
Health Insurers Are Vacuuming Up Details About You—And It Could Raise Your Rates, 
PROPUBLICA (July 17, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/health-insurers-are-vacuuming-
up-details-about-you-and-it-could-raise-your-rates [https://perma.cc/75W9-HTA8]. 
110. Pasquale & Ragone, supra note 106, at 634. Julie Brill, a former FTC Commissioner, 
revealed that one data broker “reportedly sells the names, mailing addresses, and medication lists 
of people with diseases like cancer or clinical depression. Another data broker . . . reportedly 
offers lists of consumers, their credit scores, and their specific ailments” to marketers. Id. at 630. 
111. See Ravindranath, supra note 102. 
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hire them, as these businesses seek to cherry pick the healthiest people to 
reduce their future costs.112 
Criminal Justice. The criminal justice system is also turning to algorithms, 
particularly in the realms of predictive policing, bail determinations, and 
sentencing.113 The goal is to replace flawed human decision-making with 
objective, scientific rigor, but the evidence shows that human biases remain 
in computerized systems. These algorithms can compound the mass 
incarceration of minorities, which among its many harms, depletes their 
economic stability and reinforces poverty.114 Police departments across the 
country are using predictive policing software to identify crime hot spots as 
well as likely offenders.115 Criminal justice critics charge that the software is 
merely sending police back to locations with high numbers of arrests, thereby 
creating a “self-reinforcing feedback loop”116 that “perpetuate[s] historical 
biases in enforcement.”117 
Algorithms are also used to conduct risk assessments that aim to determine 
a defendant’s dangerousness; judges then use these scores in setting bail and 
determining criminal sentences.118 Here too, an algorithm fed on historical 
crime data will reinforce discriminatory patterns of law enforcement.119 As 
 
112. Hoffman, supra note 103, at 139–40; Allen, supra note 109. Hoffman notes that the 
Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply to discriminatory predictions about future health 
problems; it applies only to discrimination based on current health conditions. Hoffman, supra 
note 103, at 150. 
113. Sandra G. Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2227–32 (2019). 
114. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
115. See FERGUSON, supra note 17; Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data 
Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 113–14 (2017). Selbst discusses both place-based and people-based 
predictive policing tools. Id. at 129–40. 
116. Caroline Haskins, Academics Confirm Major Predictive Policing Algorithm Is 
Fundamentally Flawed, VICE (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwbag4/academics-confirm-major-predictive-policing-
algorithm-is-fundamentally-flawed [https://perma.cc/F2KU-P53Z]. 
117. William Isaac & Kristian Lum, Setting the Record Straight on Predictive Policing and 
Race, APPEAL (Jan. 3, 2018), https://theappeal.org/setting-the-record-straight-on-predictive-
policing-and-race-fe588b457ca2/ [https://perma.cc/QTT4-Q9JB]; see also Kristian Lum & 
William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, 13 SIGNIFICANCE 14, 18 (2016); Mayson, supra note 113, 
at 2253 (“The choice to predict arrest has profound consequences for racial equity because in 
most places, for nearly all crime categories, arrest rates have been racially disparate for 
decades.”); Selbst, supra note 115, at 121; Dorothy E. Roberts, Digitizing the Carceral State, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1720 (2019) (book review). 
118. Karen Hao, AI Is Sending People to Jail—and Getting It Wrong, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 
21, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612775/algorithms-criminal-justice-ai 
[https://perma.cc/8KHY-DDCV]. 
119. See id. 
 
388 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
 
Dorothy Roberts states, “Computerized risk assessments are based on data 
taken from a social context that has already been shaped by hierarchies of 
race, class, and gender.”120 A ProPublica investigative report found that a risk 
assessment tool called COMPAS was predicting that black defendants pose 
a higher risk of recidivism than they do (false positives), while under-
predicting the risk for white defendants (false negatives).121 A subsequent 
study concluded that the algorithm was no better at predicting risk than 
random people solicited for an internet survey.122 
COMPAS and similar recidivism prediction algorithms claim not to 
include race as a factor, but they do include factors related to socioeconomic 
status, such as public benefits receipt and high school grades.123 The inclusion 
of these data points “involves the state explicitly telling judges that poor 
people should get longer sentences because they are poor—and, conversely, 
that socioeconomic privilege should translate into leniency.”124 Moreover, 
these predictive algorithms lack transparency, and attempts to access their 
underlying source code or model inevitably bump up against their makers’ 
claims that the algorithm is a protected trade secret, thus depriving defendants 
of due process and any ability to counter the determinations.125 This masks 
the normative and policy choices embedded in algorithms.126 On top of this, 
algorithmic discrimination is further compounded by “automation bias”: the 
psychological phenomenon in which human decision-makers overly defer to 
computerized outputs due to their veneer of objectivity.127 If judges do not 
understand how algorithms work and their potential biases and errors, they 
are likely to accede to computerized judgments. 
 Bias. Eliminating legally protected categories such as race and gender 
from the data fed into algorithms does not magically solve the problem of 
 
120. Roberts, supra note 117, at 1708. 
121. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA 
(May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing [https://perma.cc/ND3T-B68Q]. The creator of COMPAS, Northpointe, defended its 
fairness, and this dispute has received wide coverage and analysis. See, e.g., Mayson, supra note 
113, at 2234–37. 
122. Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting 
Recidivism, 4 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 3 (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/1/eaao5580 [https://perma.cc/EV4G-CR73]. 
123. Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 813 (2014). 
124. Id. at 839. 
125. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the 
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1368–71 (2018). 
126. Berman, supra note 54, at 1331. 
127. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 
1271–72 (2008). 
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bias, because those factors are associated with a range of other characteristics, 
which serve as proxies.128 For example, race can be inferred from “neutral” 
data such as zip codes, media preferences, or certain names.129 When Amazon 
rolled out same-day delivery service in twenty-seven metropolitan areas 
across America, it excluded certain zip codes that were largely African-
American.130 Amazon claimed that it did not consider race; rather, its 
algorithm was identifying zip codes with high concentrations of Prime 
members and areas closest to its warehouses.131 Yet even without an intent to 
discriminate against minorities, the result was to disadvantage people who 
already suffer from a lack of convenient and quality retail in their 
neighborhoods.132 Similarly, a study revealed that a commercial health care 
algorithm was identifying white patients for more intensive medical care than 
similarly ill black patients.133 Why? The algorithm relied on data about past 
health care expenditures to make predictions about patients’ future needs, but 
black people suffer barriers to health care access and thus have lower cost 
histories.134 By reformulating the algorithm to eliminate cost as a proxy for 
needs, the racial bias disappeared.135 
These examples demonstrate how developers can bake structural biases 
into algorithms, thereby “replicating real world inequalities”136 even if they 
have no intent to discriminate. So, as in the prior example, if black patients 
have accrued lower health care costs over time, then the training data fed into 
algorithms designed to identify health care needs will replicate these 
 
128. See Betsy A. Williams, Catherine F. Brooks & Yotam Shmargad, How Algorithms 
Discriminate Based on Data They Lack: Challenges, Solutions, and Policy Implications, 8 J. INFO. 
POL’Y 78, 86, 90 (2018). The authors assert that social category data can be used productively to 
uncover biases. Id. at 79 (“When such sensitive information is used responsibly and proactively, 
ongoing discrimination can be made transparent through data-checking processes.”). 
129. “When aiming to prevent race discrimination, for example, one may find that a host of 
attributes in the United States correlate in some way with race. Some of those may be unexpected, 
and some of those may be legitimate considerations for the decision.” Ignacio N. Cofone, 
Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1415 (2019); see 
also Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 93, at 193. 
130. David Ingold & Spencer Soper, Amazon Doesn’t Consider the Race of Its Customers. 
Should It?, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-amazon-
same-day/index.html [https://perma.cc/8R9N-ZHHX]. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. After this disparity was revealed in the media, Amazon responded by including those 
zip codes into the same-day delivery service. Id. 
133. Ziad Obermeyer et al., Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the 
Health of Populations, 366 SCI. 447, 450 (2019). 
134. Id. at 447. 
135. Id. at 453. 
136. See Chander, supra note 49, at 1039 (advocating for increased transparency for 
algorithmic inputs and outputs). 
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discriminatory trends.137 (Training data is the subset of data fed into an 
algorithm to teach the computer how to process information).138 Because 
human beings code software,139 developers can import their own unconscious 
biases into the collection and selection of data—such as using training data 
sets that are incomplete or that reflect structural inequities.140 Bias can also 
creep into algorithms when developers frame the desired outcomes of the 
algorithm and when they select the features that the algorithm considers, both 
of which necessarily involve value judgments.141 Tal Zarsky explains that 
at some points, analysts must decide which correlations and patterns 
should be incorporated into the scoring model and which must be 
set aside as ‘junk,’ random results, or statistical errors. Here, the 
analyst’s biases might shape the final outcome and the 
discriminatory effect it will involve.”142 
Moreover, because software engineers are primarily white men,143 these 
judgments may be unintentionally skewed due to a circumscribed worldview. 
As Cathy O’Neil succinctly states, “Models are opinions embedded in 
mathematics.”144 
B. Dirty Data and Careless Coding 
Layered on top of these coding problems are widespread inaccuracies in 
the data that developers select and feed into algorithms. We know a lot about 
errors in credit reporting, because it is a regulated industry. In one study, the 
FTC found that twenty percent of consumers identified mistakes in their 
credit reports and that five percent of those reports contained errors serious 
 
137. See Lillian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an 
Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 
28 (2017). 
138. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. 
REV. 671, 680 (2016). 
139. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 48, at 660–61 (stressing the need for lawyers and policymakers 
to recognize how humans shape machine learning systems). 
140. Barocas and Selbst explain in detail the mechanisms by which data mining can result in 
employment discrimination. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 138, at 677–93. 
141. Karen Hao, This Is How AI Bias Really Happens—and Why It’s So Hard to Fix, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612876/this-is-how-ai-bias-
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1375, 1391 (2014). 
143. See Waldman, supra note 24, at 615. 
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enough to lead to denials of credit or higher rates.145 These errors fall 
disproportionately on low-income consumers, who end up paying “higher 
interest rates [at] less favorable terms.”146 As a result, “[s]cores can become 
self-fulfilling prophecies, creating the financial distress they claim merely to 
indicate.”147 Although there is a statutorily-mandated process to correct credit 
reporting errors, it has been described as “Kafka-esque” due to its complexity 
and non-responsiveness by the credit reporting agencies.148 Data inaccuracies 
are even worse in the data broker industry, which operates without regulation 
or any legally-mandated processes for transparency or correction.149 
Throughout the networked big data system, data errors are rife.150 
Algorithmic decision-making, with its attendant biases and inaccuracies, 
also extends to government agencies, which interact extensively with low-
income people.151 Across the country, social service agencies are using 
automated systems, both created in-house and purchased from private 
vendors, to determine program eligibility and track compliance.152 Automated 
 
145. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, In FTC Study, Five Percent of Consumers Had 
Errors on Their Credit Reports that Could Result in Less Favorable Terms for Loans (Feb. 11, 
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Credit Reporting’s Vicious Cycles, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 305, 321 (2016) (stating 
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146. Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the CDIA Law & 
Industry Conference 4 (June 5, 2019), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1525705/slaughter_-
_remarks_at_2019_cdia_law_industry_conference_6-5-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A4E-3E8N]. 
147. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18 (2014). 
148. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS CONSUMER REPORTING 
SPECIAL EDITION 10–11 (2017), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201703_cfpb_Supervisory-Highlights-
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https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_reports/automated-injustice-redux.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XY5E-6EZW]; Letter from Americans for Financial Reform et al. to Maxine 
Waters, Chairwoman, House Fin. Servs. Comm. 1 (Dec. 9, 2019), 
http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/2019.12.9-Support-letter-for-
Protecting-Your-Credit-Score-Act-Gottheimer.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWQ2-P3P3]. 
149. See John Lucker, Susan K. Hogan & Trevor Bischoff, Predictably Inaccurate: The 
Prevalence and Perils of Bad Big Data, 21 DELOITTE REV. (July 31, 2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/deloitte-review/issue-21/analytics-bad-data-
quality.html [https://perma.cc/936U-3U8A]. 
150. Sharona Hoffman, Big Data Analytics: What Can Go Wrong, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 
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decision-making has the potential to streamline access to services and 
improve accuracy, but in some jurisdictions, the promise has been 
outweighed by the peril.153 For instance, in the Medicaid context, several 
states are adopting algorithms to determine levels of care for the disabled, 
elderly, and poor.154 In their wake, thousands of disabled people have faced 
reductions and terminations in aid and services without any explanation from 
their state or opportunities for human intervention.155 These technologically-
driven tragedies, which extend to welfare, food stamps, and other public 
benefits programs, can be traced to the building of the algorithms.156 Danielle 
Citron explains that “[p]rogrammers routinely change the substance of rules 
when translating them from human language into computer code.”157 She 
describes programmers in Colorado who, over a three-year period, 
inaccurately translated at least nine hundred state regulatory requirements 
into code, leading to hundreds of thousands of erroneous decisions, including 
improper denials of health care to pregnant women, women with breast and 
cervical cancer, and foster children, as well as improper denials of food 
stamps to the disabled.158 Such problems extend far beyond Colorado.159 
In Idaho, a class action suit was filed after disabled people saw their 
benefits slashed by as much as forty-two percent and could not get the state 
to explain its reasons or process.160 It turns out that, among other problems, 
the state’s algorithmic model for apportioning funds was trained on and using 
flawed and erroneous data.161 In Arkansas, a similar class action lawsuit 
proved that the state’s algorithm for determining Medicaid eligibility was rife 
with coding errors, such as inadvertently leaving out diabetes and improperly 
weighing the severity of cerebral palsy, prompting the lead legal aid attorney 
 
153. Valentine, supra note 16, at 378 (“The predictive algorithm systems that governments 
rely on do not work as advertised and are far from infallible.”). 
154. See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1275–79 
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156. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 48, at 669–701 (describing eight steps involved in machine 
learning and where programmers can go wrong). 
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159. Id. at 1270–71 (discussing similar errors in California and Texas); Valentine, supra note 
16, at 372–73 (discussing public benefits problems in New York City and Michigan). 
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arkansas-cerebral-palsy [https://perma.cc/NC7Y-GX7M]. 
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was, for the most part, entirely useless”); Lecher, supra note 160. 
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to query, “If states are using something so complex that they don’t understand 
it, how do we know that it’s working right? What if there’s errors?”162 
And, once algorithms are up and running, these problems are compounded 
by computer system failures;163 reductions in staff;164 lack of caseworker 
training;165 decentralized case oversight;166 loss of verification documentation 
provided by claimants;167 pressures on case workers to close cases in order to 
meet performance metrics;168 processing delays;169 lack of adequate notice to 
claimants, who are thus denied the chance to object or appeal;170 incorrect 
instructions to clients;171 and decentralized case oversight.172 Poor people face 
extreme surveillance in public benefits systems, but it is a one-way street with 
inadequate oversight over the government’s use of algorithmic decision-
making. 
Algorithms are also compounding the consequences of poverty. For 
instance, child welfare agencies are increasingly using predictive software to 
determine which claims of child neglect or abuse to investigate further and 
which to drop.173 These algorithms are more likely to sweep low-income 
families into their orbit, because they incorporate and emphasize data 
generated from programs associated almost exclusively with poor people, 
such as public benefits receipt and interaction with juvenile probation and 
youth services.174 By contrast, middle class families gather family support 
privately, from therapists, doctors, private rehabilitation programs, and 
nannies and babysitters. This is the “missing” data that never gets fed into 
child welfare algorithms. Not surprisingly, the predictions generated from 
these algorithms are inaccurate, with high rates of false positives, which can 
devastate families when children are torn from their parents.175 
Virginia Eubanks names these government surveillance technologies “the 
digital poorhouse”; it’s a place where “poor and working-class people are 
targeted by new tools of digital poverty management and face life-threatening 
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consequences as a result.”176 It is a place where technology obscures 
governmental decision-making and strips people’s ability to understand or 
challenge the forces that control their lives. 
C. Surveillance 
Algorithms underlie a wide range of surveillance systems. Facial 
recognition technology, which uses machine learning algorithms to identify 
distinctive details about a person’s face in order to match them within an 
existing database,177 is expanding. Law enforcement agencies are using facial 
recognition, typically without notice to the public or local lawmakers, to 
identify arrestees by matching their photos with those contained in multiple 
databases, such as drivers’ license records, mugshots, and social media.178 
Over half of American adults are in law enforcement facial recognition 
databases.179 At the same time, there are growing commercial applications for 
facial recognition, such as in stores and stadiums, which employ the 
technology to enhance security and to learn more about consumers.180 
In 2019, a landlord of a building serving low-income tenants in New York 
decided to replace keys with facial recognition software, thus angering 
residents who were concerned that the landlord would share their data with 
the police and use the data to push out tenants in order to gentrify the 
property.181 Public housing authorities are similarly adopting facial 
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recognition, ostensibly to enhance security, while making the daily activities 
and movements of low-income, minority people available to law 
enforcement.182 High-income residents have been more welcoming of facial 
recognition technology for the sense of security it provides and the gee-whiz 
nature of new technology.183 Yet low-income tenants are more wary because 
they face more serious consequences from surveillance, such as eviction and 
entanglement with the criminal justice system.184 This highlights how the 
same technology can have differential impacts on different groups—a 
comparison aptly described as luxury surveillance versus imposed 
surveillance.185 
Facial recognition technology has also been used to target people of color 
who are engaging in constitutionally protected speech. During the 2015 
protests in Baltimore City over the death of Freddie Gray while in police 
custody, the Baltimore City Police Department used facial recognition 
technology to identify and arrest protesters based on their social media 
postings.186 Such surveillance impinges on Americans’ right to freedom of 
assembly,187 and it disproportionately impacts people of color.188 It also flips 
democratic accountability, “with the supervisor now the supervised,” which 
in turn “harms individuals’ perceptions of themselves as citizens in a 
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democratic society.”189 Poverty already depresses democratic participation, 
thus feeding a growing economic divide as laws are passed to benefit the 
wealthy, while leaving poor Americans behind.190 
Further, facial recognition technology is problematic for its lack of 
accuracy, especially for women and people of color. For instance, researchers 
Joy Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru found an error rate of up to 34.4 percent 
points higher for darker skinned females than lighter skinned males, raising 
the risk of wrongful arrests and mistaken identity.191 But even as the software 
becomes more accurate,192 the technology remains largely unregulated, does 
not require reasonable suspicion before police access it, lacks protections 
against misuse, and usually operates without public knowledge.193 A few 
states and cities have passed laws limiting the use of facial recognition, and 
there is increasing bi-partisan support to regulate the technology,194 but it 
remains legal in the vast majority of jurisdictions and for unlimited 
purposes.195 
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Surveillance systems are also endemic in the workplace;196 employers use 
them to improve productivity, cut costs, make management and personnel 
decisions, reduce employee theft and rule breaking, limit litigation, and 
protect proprietary information.197 As technology advances, so does 
monitoring of employees.198 In the workplace, employers monitor employees 
with tools such as thumb scans, identification badges, closed circuit cameras, 
geolocation tracking, sensors on tablets and vehicles, and software that can 
analyze employees’ tones of voice and facial expressions.199 Employers can 
also examine employees’ internet browsing histories, social media usage, 
emails, phone calls, use of productivity apps, and keynote strokes.200 Many 
employers offer wellness programs, which track employees’ health and 
lifestyle choices, including their fertility and pregnancies, via fitness trackers 
and smartphone apps.201 Moreover, algorithms shape the daily experiences of 
workers as they are monitored and then nudged to the business’s desired 
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behaviors.202 There can be serious consequences from workplace 
surveillance, including physical and mental health problems resulting from 
the stress of surveillance, a loss of worker dignity and sense of autonomy, 
chilling of collective action, discrimination, and lower wages.203 Surveillance 
is most oppressive and widespread in the low-wage workforce, making it a 
key issue to economic justice.204 
Children are also increasingly surveilled. School districts across the 
country are purchasing software that monitors students’ social media and 
online activity, both inside and outside of school, in an attempt to increase 
school safety in the wake of mass violence incidents.205 This raises concerns 
about suppression of student speech and self-development, as well as the 
consequences of misinterpretation of student slang, pop culture references, 
and non-English speakers.206 Moreover, children of color already face higher 
levels of school discipline, which may be amplified by monitoring 
technology that could “disproportionately tag students of color as 
dangerous.”207 Meanwhile, there is no solid evidence that surveillance 
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Nathan Newman, Reengineering Workplace Bargaining: How Big Data Drives Lower Wages and 
How Reframing Labor Law Can Restore Information Equality in the Workplace, 85 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 693, 716–19 (2017). 
204. Gilman, supra note 197, at 1400; Wendi S. Lazar & Nantiya Ruan, Is There a Future 
for Work?, 25 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 343, 351–52 (2018); Tracy L. Vargas, Employees 
or Suspects? Surveillance and Scrutinization of Low-Wage Service Workers in U.S. Dollar Stores, 
20 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 207, 210, 208 (2017) (“[R]epressive forms of worker surveillance are most 
prevalent in non-unionized retail settings where labor organization is weak or absent, where work 
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technology improves student safety.208 This is one of many ways in which the 
consequences of surveillance systems can fall most harshly on the poor. 
D. Conclusion 
A lack of data privacy enables heightened surveillance and sorting of low-
income and other marginalized people. There are economic impacts, as 
people lose opportunities that are necessary for financial stability, such as 
housing, employment, mainstream financial services, and education, while 
facing higher levels of interaction with the criminal justice and child welfare 
systems. Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy explain how digital sorting 
systems capture behavior and thus embed moral judgements of their subjects: 
“Bad luck in missing a payment, or good fortune in having a parent who will 
pay a bill, get coded as poor or wise personal choices. One’s score falls or 
rises accordingly.”209 This classification economy also has dignitary harms, 
as people lose autonomy over their own lives and are manipulated towards 
the ends of profiteers. As one of the tenants protesting facial recognition said, 
“We’re saying we don’t want this; we’ve had enough. We should not feel like 
we’re in a prison to enter our homes.”210 
While much modern data collection and surveillance is covert and 
invisible, low-income people are particularly subject to overt surveillance 
designed not only to observe them but also to let them know they are being 
watched, such as law enforcement and workplace cameras. This sort of 
intrusion “signals disrespect to its victims and suggests to others that the 
victim lacks social standing and regard relative to other groups and 
institutions in society.”211 
At its most extreme, surveillance systems are driving marginalized people 
underground, where they remain disconnected from services and supports 
that could otherwise assist them.212 A prime example of this problem of 
hyper-invisibility due to extreme privacy befalls undocumented people in the 
United States.213 Due to fears about the federal government’s technologically-
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to go to hospitals, and not applying for food stamps and other public benefits 
for which they are eligible.214 They are becoming invisible. In sum, low-
income people live at both extreme ends of the digital privacy spectrum, and 
existing laws do little to help them calibrate their privacy needs. 
III. THE GAPS IN AMERICAN PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
Unlike the EU, the United States lacks a comprehensive privacy law 
regime. Our privacy protections are scattered among constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and the common law, as this Part surveys. Overall, in 
America, privacy is considered a good rather than a right, and as a result, 
privacy from companies has come to be discussed as a commodity 
or a privilege that individuals should always have the prerogative to 
give up, while regulation that in any way inhibits their ability to do 
so is frequently decried as paternalistic and anti-innovation.215 
This Part surveys the privacy law landscape in the United States as it relates 
to people with low socio-economic status. 
A. Constitution 
At the constitutional level, privacy rights have developed to promote 
individual autonomy in family and bodily integrity, but the Constitution is 
less protective of our personal data.216 Given the government’s power, 
combined with its extensive databases of personal information, a 
constitutional right to informational privacy—or the right to keep the 
government from collecting and disclosing our personal information—could 
be significant, particularly for poor people.217 It could restrict and enhance 
safeguards for the extensive database sharing that occurs among federal 
agencies, states, and private entities. Yet the Supreme Court has never held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects informational privacy.218 Rather, the 
Court has ruled that even if such a right exists, it was not violated under the 
facts of the handful of cases before it, largely because of adequate statutory 
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protections against disclosure in those cases.219 Thus, any defined 
constitutional right to informational privacy will have to wait until a later 
date.220 
The Fourth Amendment is another potential bulwark against the 
government’s collection and use of personal data; it protects citizens from 
unreasonable government searches and seizures.221 Under the reasonableness 
touchstone, the Court has long held that objectively reasonable expectations 
to privacy are shed when people voluntarily share information with third 
parties (the “third-party” doctrine)222 or in public.223 Thus, sending emails or 
stepping outside your front door waives any reasonable expectation to 
privacy.224 In a shift from this doctrine, the Court ruled in 2018 in Carpenter 
v. United States that a warrantless police search of cell phone site data 
violated the Fourth Amendment.225 In so doing, the Court acknowledged the 
tension between the third-party doctrine and emerging technologies, which 
government can use to track people’s lives at a granular level, over lengthy 
periods of time.226 The Court ruled that the third-party doctrine did not apply 
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to cell phone site data because cell phones are a necessity of modern life, and 
users have no choice in being tracked.227 
The reach of Carpenter beyond its narrow context remains to be seen.228 
Is there a reasonable expectation that government will not access data held in 
commercial databases given the notice-and-consent regime that currently 
governs personal data?229 How broad is the Court’s notion of voluntary 
consent? Unfortunately, the Court has long held that poor people give up their 
reasonable expectations to privacy, even in their homes, when they seek 
governmental assistance.230 If low-income people can lawfully be subject to 
investigatory home visits as a condition of receiving welfare benefits, it is 
hard to see how they can block government from accessing their data to 
manage public benefits regimes. Thus, the Fourth Amendment may serve a 
bulwark to deeply intrusive and warrantless uses of technology in police 
hands, but right now it probably has little to offer low-income people in terms 
of big data networks.231 
B. Privacy Statutes 
At the statutory level, American privacy laws are fragmented and sectoral, 
meaning they cover specific industries, such as health care providers or 
financial services companies, or specific forms of data, such as children’s 
online activity.232 Even within industries, these federal, sectoral laws are 
limited in their scope and effect,233 and there is often a mismatch between 
their objectives and technological reality. “Privacy law is primarily 
concerned with causality, whereas Big Data is generally a tool of 
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correlation.”234 Three examples of major consumer-oriented privacy laws are 
illustrative.235 
HIPPA protects patient health information collected by health care 
providers such as doctors,236 but health information shared outside covered 
contexts remains fair game for data brokers and other end users.237 That is 
why a search for “diabetes” on Google can ultimately result in a person 
paying a higher health insurance premium, why marketers can target sick 
people with advertising, or why a hospital can rely on a credit report to predict 
a patient’s compliance with a medication regime.238 
In the financial realm, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) requires 
financial institutions to explain their information-sharing practices to 
customers and to safeguard sensitive data.239 However, consumers must 
affirmatively opt out if they do not want their information shared.240 This puts 
the onus on individuals to protect their privacy,241 which can be challenging 
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given the complexity of the GLBA notices.242 In addition, the GLBA permits 
sharing of personal data between corporate affiliates, which can include a 
large web of financial and non-financial businesses.243 Furthermore, GLBA 
enforcement is entirely within the government’s hands; there is no private 
right of action.244 Meanwhile, companies like Facebook and Google are not 
financial institutions and can thus trade freely in financial information.245 
The Fair Credit and Reporting Act aims to promote fairness, accuracy, and 
privacy in the consumer reporting industry.246 These reports are used widely 
in lending, insurance, and housing contexts.247 Consumers have rights under 
FCRA to view their reports and their credit scores, dispute incorrect or 
incomplete data, be advised when information has been used against them, 
and consent before reports are shared with employers.248 However, data 
brokers largely evade FCRA’s coverage, as do any household or 
neighborhood level determinations.249 Moreover, while FCRA aims at 
ensuring the reporting of accurate information, it does nothing to protect 
against inaccurate inferences that end-users such as employers or landlords 
derive from reports.250 It also does not protect information that employers 
gather directly from their workplace surveillance systems.251 
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With regard to government-held data, the Privacy Act of 1974 is a code of 
fair information practices that governs how the federal government manages 
the information it holds about individuals.252 The Act aims to restrict agency 
disclosure of personal data, to give individuals access to government records 
containing their information and the right to amend inaccurate or irrelevant 
records, and to establish norms for agency collection, maintenance, and 
dissemination of records.253 However, the Act has numerous loopholes and 
has not kept pace with advances in modern technology, particularly given the 
massive sharing of information between public and private databases.254 Also, 
while the Privacy Act and similar state analogues govern the government’s 
storage and disclosure of information, they have not constrained the 
government’s manner of collecting information from poor people in ways 
that are often stigmatizing and degrading, using methods such as intrusive 
questioning,255 fingerprinting, and drug-testing as a condition of receiving 
public benefits.256 The Privacy Act also contains an exception for 
nonconsensual disclosure of information to law enforcement; as a result, 
“when a population is imagined to be inclined toward criminality, then that 
population exists in a state of exception under the Privacy Act.”257 Data 
gathered from these intrusive practices is then fed into government databases 
and shared with state agencies, including law enforcement, leading to the 
further criminalization of poverty.258 In sum, privacy statutes provide limited 
protections against emerging privacy harms and their associated economic 
injustices. 
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256. See Gilman, supra note 197, at 1422–23. 
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258. Gilman & Green, supra note 212, at 257; Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of 
Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 674–78 (2009). 
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C. Notice and Consent 
Outside of sectoral privacy statutes, the United States relies on self-
regulation by companies that collect and use data and puts the burden on 
consumers to protect their own data.259 This notice and consent approach 
seeks to provide consumers with information about a mobile app or website’s 
privacy policy, including its collection, use, and sharing policies, in order to 
allow the consumer to decide whether or not to engage with the app or site.260 
Theoretically, this provides consumers with autonomy, while encouraging 
tech companies to innovate. Practically, however, it fails to protect 
consumers because it is founded on a myth of a fair contractual bargain 
between providers and consumers. 
Numerous studies show that consumers do not read privacy policies 
because they are lengthy and rife with legalese and incomprehensible 
jargon.261 This is an even greater challenge for less educated consumers, who 
are more likely to be low-income and who disproportionately—and 
mistakenly—trust that privacy policies will keep their data confidential.262 
Even the most diligent and highly educated consumer could not possibly read 
the multiple privacy policies connected to their daily online usage.263 One 
study showed that it would take a person twenty-five days to read all the 
privacy policies that pop up in a year, with a national opportunity cost of $781 
 
259. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer M. Urban, Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo 
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billion.264 And even if consumers read and understood those polices, data 
collectors could still reserve the right to change their policies in the future 
without a new round of notice and consent.265 Moreover, notice and consent 
policies do not give consumers control over how third parties use their data 
after buying it,266 or how inferences about them are generated from data 
scraped by their social network “friends.”267 
Furthermore, data privacy policies are meaningless if they are breached. 
Notice and consent do nothing to forestall or remedy broken privacy 
promises, such as failure to adhere to the terms of a notice, negligent security 
practices, or wrongful retention of personal data.268 Companies have tried to 
convince legislators and the public that they can effectively self-regulate, but 
the resulting internal processes often lack transparency, are drafted without 
input from consumers, are underfunded and short-term, and remain 
unenforced.269 In addition, many companies refuse to implement even the 
most basic privacy protections.270 For all these reasons, self-regulation can 
operate as a cover for companies to look as though they are attuned to 
consumers but is no substitute for substantive regulation.271 
 
264. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 
I/S 543, 565 (2008). 
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KQGF]; Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 909 (2013) (describing how such 
privacy lurches, or changes in promised policies, “disrupt long-settled expectations”); Sprague & 
Ciocchetti, supra note 261, at 126. 
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Data Privacy and Security, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY 15, 26 (2015) (concluding 
that membership in a self-regulatory body has no impact on privacy performance). 
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N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (June 16, 2015, 12:10 AM), 
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recognition/ [https://perma.cc/8CVE-UG99]. 
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D. Enforcement 
For now, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the United States’ 
primary privacy enforcer,272 with the job of holding companies to the 
promises they make in the notice-and-consent regime. The FTC enforces § 5 
of the FTC Act, which declares unlawful “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices,” and which the FTC uses to fill the gaps left by the existing 
patchwork statutory approach to privacy.273 Using this authority, the FTC has 
created a “common law” of privacy protections, in which it has taken 
enforcement actions against companies that violated their posted privacy 
policies, altered policies without consumer consent, made false 
representations to induce consumer consent, or failed to secure consumers’ 
data.274 Some FTC investigations have resulted in consent orders in which 
companies agree to implement measures to prevent future violations; these 
orders constitute a guide to best practices regarding permissible data uses that 
other companies rely upon.275 However, this is a reactive, rather than 
proactive stance,276 and it is further hobbled by limited firepower, with only 
forty full-time employees working on privacy issues.277 Moreover, with 
regard to enforcement, the FTC cannot fine companies unless they violate an 
existing consent order, and fines have been “small in relation to the gravity 
of the violations.”278 
Effective enforcement also hinges on identifying privacy deprivations, yet 
much of the surveillance industry operates without consumers’ knowledge. 
And, the industry wants to maintain that opacity. Algorithmic decision-
making has been called a “black box” because of the complexity and lack of 
transparency around machine learning.279 Attempts to breach the wall have 
been met with companies claiming non-disclosure agreements and trade 
secret protection for their software.280 A criminal defendant in Wisconsin 
 
272. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 383. 
273. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 232, at 599, 621. 
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named Eric Loomis attempted to gain access to the COMPAS system to 
understand, and challenge, his sentencing recommendation.281 The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court upheld the denial of the defendant’s request, holding that the 
risk assessment’s underlying code could remain secret, partly because the 
algorithmic recommendation was a helpful factor, but not determinative, in 
the judge’s decision-making.282 
As the Loomis case demonstrates, in claims against the government for 
algorithmic transparency, individuals struggle to effectuate their due process 
rights to notice and a hearing.283 The barriers are multiple: people are often 
unaware that a particular governmental or corporate decision was algorithm-
generated; they may struggle to access information about the algorithm due 
to trade secret protections or government withholding of information; and if 
they are able to obtain information about an algorithm, they may be incapable 
of understanding its complexities.284 
E. Anti-Discrimination Law 
Current anti-discrimination law is similarly constrained in its potential to 
combat algorithmic inequality. Where discrimination is intentional, as in the 
Facebook advertising case, federal civil rights statutes can provide an 
effective remedy.285 Of course, this requires that victims know they are the 
subject of discrimination—yet most people never know why they do not get 
a job interview or rental unit for which they applied. In addition to being 
invisible, much modern discrimination is unintentional and based instead on 
subconscious biases as well as historic patterns of structural inequality.286 
Thus, many discrimination cases hinge upon disparate impact theory, which 
makes neutral policies or practices unlawful if they have differential impacts 
on protected groups.287 
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Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst have explained why disparate impact 
theory is ill-fit for combatting digital discrimination in employment under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.288 Algorithmic models analyze 
massive amounts of data that can be highly predictive of job performance; 
thus, courts permit employers to use them to match potential employees with 
job-related hiring criteria.289 At the same time, due to the opacity of 
algorithms, plaintiffs struggle to identify alternative employment practices 
that achieve the same goals of accuracy while being less discriminatory, as 
Title VII requires.290 Similar barriers to disparate impact cases arise in other 
contexts—a situation recently made worse when the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development announced proposed regulatory changes that, if 
adopted, will undermine disparate impact theory in housing cases by allowing 
landlords to rely, without liability, on algorithms created by third parties.291 
Moreover, it remains the case that poverty is not a protected class under 
any anti-discrimination laws, making it perfectly acceptable to discriminate 
on the basis of social class.292 Poverty also limits people from accessing legal 
recourse for digital discrimination, in part due to a shortage of civil legal aid 
lawyers and overwhelmed public defenders in criminal cases.293 In addition, 
companies are evading discrimination litigation by requiring employees and 
consumers to sign arbitration agreements that keep disputes out of court and 
 
Housing Act, the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities 
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shrouded in secrecy, while also forbidding employees from joining 
collectively to challenge discrimination.294 
Finally, discrimination law covers only a subset of the technological harms 
impacting low-income people. The ability to obtain a low-skill job with a 
living wage, predictable hours, health care benefits, and affordable childcare 
is not solely a matter of purging discriminatory employers from the 
workplace. There is an entire sector of our economy that exploits workers 
regardless of their race, ethnicity, or gender. Likewise, there is not enough 
affordable housing in the United States, and thus getting rid of discriminatory 
lenders and landlords can reduce segregation, but it will not solve the 
structural problem of supply and demand. Public benefit systems serve only 
poor people, so a welfare movement that asks to be treated the same as the 
rich is meaningless to the social service bureaucracy. In other words, digital 
deprivations prey upon structural divisions within our economy. Illegal 
discrimination magnifies these disparities, but equality doctrine alone cannot 
lead to equity. Non-discrimination law serves the goal of equality, which is 
about treating people the same. By contrast, equity is about giving people 
what they need to be successful. Because discrimination law is not about 
fulfilling substantive guarantees to life’s necessities, it can never do the heavy 
lifting of eliminating digital exploitation. 
F. Workplace Protections 
On the employment front, legal protections are equally scant. There are no 
federal laws securing employee privacy in the workplace.295 State law 
protections, where they exist, are narrow. A few states protect employees 
from turning over their social media passwords to their bosses, and some 
require employee consent to electronic tracking, but these laws are narrow 
and scattered.296 
Tort law does not prohibit most employer surveillance (or any form of 
surveillance).297 There is a tort that protects against “intrusion upon 
seclusion,” defined as an intrusion that would be “highly offensive to a 
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296. Ajunwa et al., supra note 196, at 757, 758–59. 
297. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 385 (“Courts have largely been disinclined to 
stretch the tort of privacy to online surveillance and other Internet-related intrusions.”). 
 
412 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
 
reasonable person.”298 This is a high bar, and thus this tort prohibits only the 
most extreme and highly sensitive invasions of personal privacy in the 
workplace, such as cameras in locker rooms or bathrooms, and it provides no 
protection against the bulk of employer monitoring.299 The common law 
privacy torts were created to protect elite members of society from public 
scrutiny, and thus not surprisingly, they hold no promise for low-wage 
workers or public benefit recipients.300 
In sum, neither current American privacy laws nor anti-discrimination 
statutes currently have the teeth to secure data privacy or prevent digital 
discrimination. “In this legal universe, the rhetoric of bilateral self-interest 
holds sway.”301 Not surprisingly, there is an emerging consensus that America 
needs comprehensive privacy legislation.302 There is less attention to the 
unique privacy needs and perspectives of low-income communities. The 
GDPR provides a starting point and model for considering data privacy 
protections. 
IV. FIVE GDPR PRINCIPLES TO ADVANCE ECONOMIC JUSTICE 
The GDPR went into effect in the EU on May 18, 2018.303 The GDPR 
provides a unified privacy law framework for EU member-countries.304 In 
contrast to U.S. privacy laws, the GDPR places multiple obligations on the 
entities that gather, hold, and use personal data (called “data controllers),305 
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while also granting consumers (called “data subjects”) rights to enhance their 
control over personal information.306 The GDPR is based on the long-
standing EU conception of privacy as a fundamental human right that 
constrains both government and private entities.307 Whereas in the United 
States, data collection is freely allowed unless a specific law prohibits it; in 
the EU, a data controller can only collect data with a legally granted basis.308 
Under the GDPR, data subjects possess these core rights309: 
 to be informed when data is being collected, including how 
and why it will be processed, along with a notice of 
rights,310 
 to provide informed consent before personal data is 
processed,311 
 to object or withdraw consent to processing of personal 
data, including the right to opt out of direct marketing,312 
 to access personal data in an understandable format and in 
a timely manner,313 
 to request correction of inaccurate or incomplete data,314 
 to have personal data erased (the right to be forgotten),315 
 to have personal data transferred from one service provider 
to another (the right to portability),316 
 to obtain human intervention in significant decisions based 
on automated processing,317 and 
 
306. Id. at art. 4(1); see also Barrett, supra note 28, at 1083 (describing the GDPR’s rights-
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note 1, at recital (4). 
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311. Id. at arts. 6(1), 7. 
312. Id. at arts. 7(3), 21. 
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 to demand an explanation regarding automated 
processing.318 
With this combination of controller responsibilities and data subject rights, 
the GDPR seeks to vindicate principles of lawfulness, fairness, and 
transparency; purpose limitation; data minimization; accuracy; storage 
limitation; integrity and confidentiality; and accountability.319 
The GDPR permits country-specific derogations on certain issues and 
contains unresolved textual ambiguities. Thus, many terms of the GDPR will 
gain further definition and content as the law is implemented and enforced 
over the coming years. Interpretive sources include the Recitals in the 
Preamble, guidance issued by the Article 29 Working Party (A29WP) (an 
advisory board of data protection authorities from across the EU), and the 
interpretations of member-country enforcement agencies.320 Despite its 
ambiguities, the GDPR contains several provisions that have the potential—
if enforced—to limit the big data harms to low-income and marginalized 
communities and, by enhancing transparency and accountability, to spur 
more targeted, substantive protections in the future. These five principles 
have the potential to advance economic justice: (1) the right to an 
explanation, (2) the right not to be subject to decisions based on automated 
profiling, (3) the right to be forgotten, (4) a requirement of public 
participation, and (5) robust implementation and enforcement.321 Only time 
will tell if these provisions fulfill their potential to enhance the data privacy 
of vulnerable groups, but they provide an existing template for thinking about 
how to shape comprehensive privacy laws in the United States, at both the 
federal and state levels. Each one is discussed in turn. 
A. Right to an Explanation 
The “black box” of algorithmic decision-making hinders transparency, 
legibility, and accountability. The GDPR contains several provisions 
designed to open the box, including what has been popularly termed the 
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“right to an explanation.”322 Under the GDPR, entities that handle the 
personal data of EU citizens must “ensure fair and transparent processing” in 
automated decision-making by providing citizens with “meaningful 
information about the logic involved.”323 The scope of the GDPR’s right to 
an explanation is hotly contested within the scholarly and technical 
communities.324 One core question is whether the explanation should be about 
how the automated decision-making system was applied to a specific person, 
or whether it should describe how the system operates as a whole. Solon 
Barocas and Andrew Selbst frame this as a choice between “outcome-based” 
or “logic-based” explanations.325 Outcome-based explanations focus on the 
facts that proved relevant to a particular machine-generated decision.326 These 
explanations can potentially provide people with information necessary to 
correct errors or omissions, or to make a fix to their data to obtain goods or 
services (such as by changing their spending patterns to improve their credit 
rating). However, individualized explanations generally are not sufficient to 
uncover disparate impacts on certain groups or to solve structural problems 
that can be baked into algorithms.327 
Accordingly, logic-based explanations might be necessary to ferret out 
digital discrimination. Such an explanation could reveal coding biases, 
improper interpretations of regulatory or business objectives, adverse impacts 
on particular groups, and other embedded problems in particular models.328 
The challenge with logic-based explanations is that they are often complex, 
if not inscrutable, to the layperson.329 Even computer scientists and engineers 
can struggle to understand the machine learning mechanisms that they set in 
motion, because machine learning can be opaque, with “constellations of 
data . . . so complex that it’s tough to retrace the line drawn by the 
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Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation, 7 INT’L DATA 
PRIVACY L. 233, 233–34, 237–39 (2017) (summarizing debate). 
325. Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1099 (2018); cf. Edwards & Veale, supra note 137, at 55 (tracking the 
difference between model-centric versus subject-centric explanations). 
326. Selbst & Barocas, supra note 325, at 1100. 
327. Id. at 1105 (explaining that a single consumer cannot observe disparate impact, and an 
outcome-based explanation does not reveal why a system was constructed a certain way, which 
is necessary to prove disparate impact). 
328. See id. at 1108–09. 
329. Id. at 1093–94. 
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machine.”330 Providing laypeople with confusing explanations may 
technically comply with a regulatory command, but “[r]ights become 
dangerous things if they are unreasonably hard to exercise or ineffective in 
results, because they give the illusion that something has been done while in 
fact things are no better.”331 Moreover, people generally do not want a tutorial 
in machine learning methodology; rather, they want a decision in their favor, 
or at least guidance on how to secure one.332 
Accordingly, Andrew Selbst and Julia Powles argue that any explanation 
must serve the instrumental value of being “at least meaningful enough to 
facilitate the data subject’s exercise of her rights guaranteed by the GDPR 
and human rights law.”333 Similarly, Margot Kaminski calls for an 
explanation that “provide[s] enough information that an individual can act on 
it.”334 In other words, “the substance of the other underlying legal rights often 
determines” the nature of the right to an explanation.”335 The A29WP has 
issued guidance that reflects these insights, providing that “a complex 
mathematical explanation” is not necessary and instead defining “meaningful 
information about the logic involved” to include (1) the categories of data 
used in processing; (2) the relevance of the data; (3) how profiles are built; 
(4) the relevance of the profile to the decision-making process; and (5) how 
the profile is used for an individualized decision.336 
The concept of an explanation for algorithmic decision-making is not 
foreign to American law. The United States has consumer statutes that give 
consumers the right to an outcome-based explanation with regard to 
unfavorable consumer reports that impact their access to credit, employment, 
 
330. Dave Gershgorn, We Don’t Understand How AI Make Most Decisions, so Now 
Algorithms Are Explaining Themselves, QUARTZ (Dec. 20, 2016), https://qz.com/865357/we-
dont-understand-how-ai-make-most-decisions-so-now-algorithms-are-explaining-themselves/ 
[https://perma.cc/4JC3-AYXA]; see also Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. 
PA. L. REV. 633, 638 (2017); Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: 
Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, NEW 
MEDIA & SOC’Y (2016), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1461444816676645 
[https://perma.cc/UP7L-GPQD]. 
331. Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm: From a “Right to an 
Explanation” to a “Right to Better Decisions”?, 16 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 46, 50 (2018). 
332. Edwards & Veale, supra note 137, at 42. 
333. Selbst & Powles, supra note 324, at 236. 
334. Kaminski, supra note 320, at 213. 
335. Id.; see also Edwards & Veale, supra note 137, at 55–58. 
336. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-
Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, at 31, WP 251, (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/document.cfm?doc_id=49826 [https://perma.cc/M92K-
BGZ6] [hereinafter A29WP]. 
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insurance, or housing.337 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FRCRA) and the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) together seek to ensure that credit 
reports are fair, accurate, and non-discriminatory.338 These laws require that 
individuals whose consumer reports are used adversely in lending, 
employment, insurance, or housing be issued an “adverse action notice.”339 
In the credit context, the notices typically advise consumers which factors, 
from a pre-set checklist of twenty-four reasons, resulted in their adverse 
action; listed factors include “credit application incomplete;” “unable to 
verify credit references;” and “temporary or irregular employment” and the 
like.340 
The FCRA/ECOA “explanation” is thus outcome-based. With the adverse 
action notice in hand, consumers supposedly have the opportunity to better 
understand decisions that impact them, to take steps to reverse the action, and 
to prevent discrimination.341 Still, the FCRA explanation does not tell a 
person how or why the listed factor adversely impacted their score.342 And it 
cannot effectively uncover disparate impact.343 By contrast, the GDPR’s 
requirement that controllers provide data subjects with information of the 
“logic involved” in a decision appears to envisage a broader, more detailed 
explanation about how the automated decision-making model operates.344 In 
short, the GDPR is aimed at a “meaningful” explanation, and not a FCRA-
style checklist, which can be illusory. At this time, it remains to be seen how 
EU enforcement authorities will interpret the “right to an explanation.” 
On this side of the Atlantic, policymakers should recognize that both 
outcome-based and logic-based explanations are warranted, depending on the 
circumstances, to advance data privacy that fosters non-discrimination and 
economic justice. We know that algorithms are impacting access to 
employment, education, housing, health care, financial services, insurance, 
consumer goods, electoral information, and public benefits in the United 
 
337. See Selbst & Barocas, supra note 325, at 1099–1100. 
338. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2018) (FCRA); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2018) (ECOA); 
see also Selbst & Barocas, supra note 325, at 1102. On the purposes underlying the statutes, see 
Shepard, supra note 87, at 1746 (“Congress’s primary objective was to give consumers a 
meaningful participatory role in an otherwise ex parte ‘trial’ that had the potential to deprive a 
consumer of credit, insurance, and employment.”). 
339. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m, 1691(d)(2) (2018). 
340. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002 app. C (2018) (the sample notification form issued by the Federal 
Reserve Bank to satisfy the adverse action notification requirements). 
341. Selbst & Barocas, supra note 325, at 1102. 
342. See Hertza, supra note 87, at 1727. 
343. Selbst & Barocas, supra note 325, at 1104–05. 
344. Id. at 1107. 
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States.345 We know far less about how algorithms are designed, the data that 
feeds them, the desired outcomes, or whether the models are accurate in 
meeting those outcomes. A statutory right to an explanation would provide 
much needed transparency around these issues. Transparency is foundational 
to accountability, which in turn “empowers those who might otherwise be 
powerless, demanding that those who wield power over them offer an account 
of their conduct.”346 
In some circumstances, an outcome-based explanation may be adequate to 
ensure that a system is operating fairly and in compliance with the law. For 
instance, a legal services lawyer could use a right to an explanation to benefit 
clients, without having to undertake onerous litigation. In the current “black 
box” environment, it is difficult to know why a client was denied a job or 
housing or public benefits or the like, or even if an algorithm was involved. 
Further, much litigation involving low-income people has no discovery or 
very limited discovery tools.347 And even where discovery is available, it is a 
poor substitute for a right to an explanation, because it occurs only after cases 
are filed—and cases cannot be filed without a good faith basis to believe that 
wrongful conduct has occurred.348 Thus, a right to an outcome-based 
explanation would open the algorithmic black box to scrutiny, allowing 
consumers to correct errors or omissions in their personal data; to request 
reconsideration; to explain why the algorithm is inaccurate or inappropriate 
given their personal situation; or to take steps to improve one’s chance at 
meeting the algorithm’s desired outcomes. On the technical side, computer 
scientists are devising explanatory systems that “translate” code into 
cognizable visualizations and interactions for laypersons, and research in this 
area is constantly evolving.349 These tools can help low-income people and 
their advocates identify actionable claims, particularly since lawyers who 
represent low-income people typically lack resources for costly experts to 
help them understand and litigate scientific and technical material. 
In other circumstances, it may be necessary to challenge an underlying 
model, such as when the algorithm inaccurately interprets the law or 
discriminates against protected groups. Consider Facebook’s advertising 
 
345. See supra Part II. 
346. Gillis & Simons, supra note 320, at 76. 
347. See BRITTANY K.T. KAUFFMAN, ALLOCATING THE COSTS OF DISCOVERY: LESSONS 
LEARNED AT HOME AND ABROAD 2–3 (2014), 
https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/allocating_the_costs_of_discovery
.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7LR-N3ZD]. 
348. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
349. Edwards & Veale, supra note 137, at 62–63; Kaminski, supra note 320, at 214; Selbst 
& Barocas, supra note 325, at 1114–17. 
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system, which was employing algorithms to allow advertisers to exclude 
women, older workers, minorities, and other defined groups from seeing 
certain ads in their feeds.350 In such a situation, an individualized outcome-
based explanation would not be adequate to dissemble the entire system.351 In 
addition, there may be situations in which people question whether or not 
automated decision-making is appropriate for the setting at hand. 
Understanding how a model operates may help answer whether automated 
decision-making is a valid exercise of commercial or governmental power. 
Thus, American law should require explanations not only for dissatisfied 
or curious individuals but also to regulatory experts and independent third 
parties with the technical chops to audit systems for accuracy, as well as “for 
noncompliance with values like equality, nondiscrimination, dignity, privacy, 
and human rights.”352 Audits are “the most prevalent social scientific method 
for the detection of discrimination” in machine learning systems.353 The law 
can also require that algorithmic systems build in technical accountability, 
meaning software “that furnishes relevant evidence to support evaluation 
and . . . . assures that the subject of any such processes can determine that the 
rules and procedures have been followed.”354 Significantly, the GDPR’s right 
to an explanation both contains “individual transparency rights” and a 
“systemic approach to algorithmic accountability.”355 The GDPR’s systemic 
approach is accomplished in part through outside algorithmic audits by 
 
350. See supra text accompanying notes 67–75. 
351. Selbst & Barocas, supra note 325, at 1105 (arguing that a consumer’s “single point of 
reference does not provide any understanding of the frequency of denials along protected-class 
lines, so she cannot observe disparate impact”). 
352. Waldman, supra note 24, at 630 (advocating for substantive audits in lieu of process-
oriented proposals). “In addition, a system could be built to enable participants to check these 
properties for their own outcomes so that nontechnical users could verify these facts while the 
system as a whole would be overseen by others—potentially both inside and outside of 
government—who have the necessary technological expertise.” Kroll et al., supra note 330, at 
703. 
353. Christian Sandvig et al., Auditing Algorithms: Research Methods for Detecting 
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government authorities and independent third parties, as well as through 
internal Data Protection Impact Assessments.356 
In the GDPR, the right to an explanation is designed to improve the 
fairness, transparency, and accountability of algorithmic decision-making, 
and likewise in the United States, a right to an explanation should be shaped 
broadly and contextually to effectuate that objective. Explanations can help 
uncover digital discrimination and exploitation against the poor, improve the 
accuracy of automated decision-making systems that sort the poor and serve 
as gatekeepers to life necessities, and expose surveillance systems to public 
scrutiny. In all these ways, the right to an explanation can enhance economic 
justice. 
B. Right to Object to Automated Profiling 
Article 22 of the GDPR gives individuals the “right not to be subject to a 
decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling” when the 
decision produces “legal effects” or “similarly significant[ ] [e]ffects” on the 
individual.357 In short, it ensures humans have recourse to human decision-
makers on important decisions that impact their lives. Automated processing 
has serious consequences for low-income populations, who are more likely 
to be subject to algorithmic decisions and for whom the stakes are high. As 
Cathy O’Neil explains, “The privileged . . . are processed more by people, 
the masses by machines.”358 For example, “A white-shoe law firm or an 
exclusive prep school will lean far more on recommendations and face-to-
face interviews than will a fast-food chain or a cash-strapped urban school 
district.”359  
The GDPR defines automated processing broadly with a nod toward the 
consequences of socioeconomic profiling. Its definition covers the processing 
of factors that can be used to segment people by social class and other 
categories. It applies to data used “to analyse or predict aspects concerning 
[a] natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, 
personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or 
 
356. Kaminski, supra note 320, at 205–06. 
357. GDPR, supra note 1, at art. 22(1). Article 22 contains three exceptions: (a) for 
processing necessary for performing a contract, (b) where the law permits it and there are 
safeguards for the data subject’s rights, and (c) where the data subject has given explicit consent. 
Id. at art. 22(2). 
358. O’NEIL, supra note 14, at 8. 
359. Id. 
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movements.”360 Even when people consent to automated processing, which 
is a permissible basis for processing under the GDPR, a data controller must 
still provide “suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights,” 
including “at least the right to obtain human intervention . . . to express [the 
data subject’s] point of view and to contest the decision.”361 Moreover, some 
sensitive data are off the table for profiling altogether in the absence of 
explicit consent or other narrow, protective exceptions362: racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, health 
data, sex life, sexual orientation, and genetic data.363 The GDPR thus provides 
a backstop against algorithmic inferences and predictions about people that 
might not be accurate, fair, or appropriate. 
There are three key questions about the scope of Article 22 that remain to 
be resolved as the GDPR is implemented: (1) how much human intervention 
takes a decision outside the scope of Article 22’s protections? (2) what 
constitutes a decision with “legal” or “similarly significant” effect? and 
(3) does Article 22 ban these forms of automated processing altogether or 
instead provide data subjects with a right to opt out of such processing?364 
Each of these questions can be answered narrowly or broadly. Adopting the 
most privacy protective resolution to each of these open questions would 
enhance the economic mobility of low-income people. 
To begin with, the GDPR recognizes the importance of keeping a human 
in the loop when automated decision-making is used. In many contexts, 
algorithmic outputs are not determinative on their own but are used to inform 
human judgments. Consider the COMPAS criminal sentencing algorithm in 
which a judge considers the algorithm’s recommendation in assessing a 
defendant’s likelihood of re-offense.365 Here, the algorithm is supposed to 
inform the judge’s decision-making and not to supplant it. This would not 
violate the GDPR’s ban on solely automated decision-making. To be sure, 
there are concerns that judges are too deferential to algorithms because they 
 
360. GDPR, supra note 1, at art. 4(4) (emphasis added). 
361. Id. at arts. 7, 22(3). 
362. Other exceptions are if the processing is necessary to perform a contract or is legally 
authorized, and there are “suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms 
and legitimate interests.” Id. at art. 22(2). 
363. Id. at arts. 9(1), 22(4). 
364. See generally Michael Veale & Lilian Edwards, Clarity, Surprises, and Further 
Questions in the Article 29 Working Party Draft Guidance on Automated Decision-Making and 
Profiling, 34 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 398 (2018). 
365. See supra text accompanying notes 118–122. 
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see them as objective and infallible; this is the dilemma of automation bias.366 
Still, the judicial system keeps a “human in the loop” and provides 
mechanisms for advocacy and an adversarial process to contest the 
algorithmically-informed outcome. This judicial process would thus satisfy 
the GDPR’s ban on solely automated processing, although risk prediction 
algorithms may well run afoul of constitutional due process and equal 
protection norms and be litigated on those grounds.367 In other words, the 
transparency provided by a strong privacy law can be a foundation to seek 
accountability via other legal doctrines. 
Consider, by contrast, an algorithm that sorts job applicants by predicting 
who is most likely to stay with the company long-term. A human resources 
employee who prints out a batch of applications meeting the algorithmic 
threshold and automatically sets up interviews with those candidates would 
not constitute meaningful human interaction. Thus, the company’s decision 
to deny an interview to a person without any opportunities for an explanation 
or to challenge the decision would constitute a form of impermissible 
automated profiling.368 
Of course, this right cannot possibly attach to every instance of automated 
decision-making; these tools touch almost every sector of the economy.369 For 
this reason, Article 22 applies only to decisions with legal or similarly 
significant effects. The A29WP opines that significant decisions include 
those that affect financial circumstances, access to health services, access to 
education, or that deny employment.370 These are all key elements of 
achieving economic stability. 
By contrast, it is generally assumed that targeted advertising—even 
though it relies extensively on automated profiling—falls outside the scope 
 
366. See supra text accompanying note 127; see also Angèle Christin, Alex Rosenblat & 
Danah Boyd, Courts and Predictive Algorithms, DATA & SOC’Y 8 (Oct. 27, 2015), 
https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Angele%20Christin.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UXS6-XDW2] (stating that an algorithm “seems more reliable, scientific, and 
legitimate than other sources of information,” despite the reality that algorithmic quality varies 
immensely). 
367. See generally Starr, supra note 123. 
368. See Veale & Edwards, supra note 364, at 400 (“There is a strong argument therefore 
that rights to control ‘solely’ automated decision making must also apply to decisions made with 
some degree of human involvement . . . .”). These two examples only touch upon the wide range 
of human involvement in automated decision. See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Karen Levy 
& Daniel Susser, Strange Loops: Apparent Versus Actual Human Involvement in Automated 
Decision Making, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 745 (2019). 
369. Veale & Edwards, supra note 364, at 399. 
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of Article 22.371 People may be annoyed or find it creepy to be followed 
around social media with sneaker advertisements after briefly viewing a Nike 
basketball shoe online,372 but it will not likely have a significant impact on 
their life.373 Nevertheless, some targeted ads are aimed at particularly 
vulnerable consumers in manipulative ways that can have serious 
consequences. Examples include advertising for payday loans and for-profit 
educational institutions, which are targeted to minority and low-income 
people but would rarely appear in the social media feed of a high-income 
earner.374 Latanya Sweeney compared Google searches of female names 
associated with blacks (such as Latanya and Latisha) to searches of more 
typically white names (such as Kristen and Jill) and found that ads related to 
an arrest record appeared more frequently for the former than the latter.375 
This disparity could have detrimental effects if an employer is conducting a 
background check by searching an applicant’s name, and it can also harm a 
person’s self-identity and dignity regardless of the employment 
consequences. 
Safiya Noble describes disturbingly sexist and racist content generated in 
response to internet searches of terms relating to minority groups and 
women.376 For instance, when Noble conducted a Google search in 2011 of 
the term “black girls,” the top results were links to pornography.377 Such 
results compound race and gender profiling, “and even economic redlining,” 
as discriminatory digital profiles control access to key resources and 
opportunities.378 Noble explains that machine learning is not neutral; rather, 
it includes “decision-making protocols that favor corporate elites and the 
powerful.”379 
In this vein, the A29WP acknowledges that dignitary impacts on certain 
groups can be significant, stating that prohibited forms of solely automated 
processing include those that “have the potential to significantly affect the 
 
371. Id. 
372. See IGO, supra note 2, at 352 (discussing the framing of privacy concerns related to data 
collection practices). 
373. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1029 (2014) 
(arguing “the experience is not a comfortable one” and is fairly described as “Kafkaesque”). 
374. O’NEIL, supra note 14, at 144. 
375. Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, CORNELL U. (Jan. 29, 2013), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.6822 [https://perma.cc/MH4Q-LVC6]. 
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377. Id. at 3. 
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circumstances, behavior or choices of the individuals concerned.”380 
Significant effects thus must be judged by the intrusiveness of the profiling 
process, the expectations and wishes of the individuals concerned, the manner 
in which the ad is delivered, and the particular vulnerabilities of the data 
subjects targeted.381 There are thus times when targeted advertisements may 
be impermissible. 
Limitations on automated processing would help expand opportunities for 
low-income people in the United States. Despite America’s identity as a 
socially mobile society, the reality is that most people’s economic standing 
is determined by the parents to whom they are born.382 Forty percent of 
children born in the bottom quintile of the income scale will remain there 
their entire lives; and the same is true of forty percent born in the top 
quintile.383 The poverty rate is almost twelve percent, or 38.1 million 
people,384 while millions more above the official poverty line struggle to meet 
basic needs.385 Even in times of robust economic growth, growing economic 
inequality has continued unabated.386 The top one percent earns sixteen 
percent of the nation’s income and holds almost forty percent of its wealth,387 
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while wage stagnation plagues middle class and low-wage workers despite 
their productivity and low rates of unemployment.388 
Unrestrained automated profiling risks further entrenching these trends 
because it can perpetuate inaccurate and biased inferences about people 
without their knowledge or avenues for recourse, which, in turn, limits 
opportunities and traps people in cycles of disadvantage.389 Further, 
employers and businesses can mine data to adopt practices that limit people’s 
autonomy and chances for economic advancement.390 In all these ways, 
automated profiling can lead to digital discrimination and economic 
exploitation, while masking inaccuracies and incomplete data. Moreover, 
without a human in the loop, surveillance determinations might punish 
certain categories of people without due process. Limitations on automated 
profiling could temper these outcomes. It would push entities relying upon 
algorithms to provide basic due process protections to impacted individuals, 
thereby fulfilling values of transparency and accountability, while improving 
accuracy in decision-making. 
C. Right To Be Forgotten and Criminal Records 
The GDPR contains a right to be forgotten, guaranteeing data subjects the 
right to demand that a data controller erase their personal data.391 The right 
derives from a 2014 case decided by the European Court of Justice, called 
Google v. Spain, holding that Europeans have a right to demand that search 
engines remove links to their personal data.392 In that case, a Spanish national 
objected to the results of internet searches of his name that brought up 
evidence of past debt.393 The court reasoned that a private person’s right to 
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interest in finding the information, although these competing factors require 
a case-by-case balancing.394 This right does not delete online content about a 
data subject altogether; rather, it makes that content more difficult to find via 
a search engine.395 A similar, narrowly tailored right to be forgotten in the 
United States could promote economic justice. 
As Dan Solove has noted, “People grow and change, and disclosures of 
information from their past can inhibit their ability to reform their behavior, 
to have a second chance, or to alter their life’s direction.”396 A second chance 
can be particularly important for people who experience poverty, which 
operates as a social stigma. Moreover, “due to modern digital technologies 
and global networks, forgetting has become the exception, and remembering 
the new rule.”397 As noted above, the official poverty rate is almost twelve 
percent.398 However, poverty in America is not a static condition. Most poor 
people remain under the poverty line only for short periods of time, although 
they may cycle in and out of poverty over their lifetimes.399 Almost half of 
poverty spells end within a year, while seventy percent end within three 
years.400 Only twelve percent of poverty spells last more than a decade.401 
Poverty may be short-term, but it is widespread. Almost half of Americans 
will fall below the poverty line for at least one year between the ages of 
twenty-five and seventy-five.402 At some point, two-thirds of all Americans 
between twenty and sixty-five will turn to a social welfare program such as 
food stamps or Medicaid.403 In short, there is a lot of movement in and out of 
poverty, largely due to economic instability such as job losses, low wages, 
caretaking obligations, divorce, and illness.404 Moreover, poverty is more 
 
394. Id. at ¶ 97. 
395. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 406. 
396. Solove, supra note 224, at 533. 
397. Michal Lavi, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly Behavior, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2597, 
2628 (2019). 
398. SEMEGA ET AL., supra note 384, at 1. 
399. ICELAND, supra note 43, at 61. 
400. See id. 
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402. Approximately forty-two percent of Americans will fall into the bottom tenth percentile 
of the income distribution, while sixty percent will fall into the bottom twentieth percentile for at 
least one year between the ages of twenty-five and sixty. MARK R. RANK & THOMAS A. HIRSCHL, 
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than a low income—it is “better understood as something akin to correlated 
adversity that cuts across multiple dimensions (material, social, bodily, 
psychological) and institutions (schools, neighborhoods, prisons).”405 
Algorithms impact all these dimensions, and are used by—or targeted at—all 
these institutions. 
Poor people in America face discrimination due to their economic status, 
which is compounded by intersectional factors such as race, ethnicity, and 
gender.406 Nevertheless, poverty is not a protected class in American anti-
discrimination law, meaning that it is perfectly legal to discriminate against 
poor people.407 In American culture, poor people are stigmatized as lazy and 
dishonest and blamed for their economic status, even though poverty is rooted 
in structural, rather than cultural, factors.408 Poverty today is driven by a 
multitude of interlocking factors, including the growth of low-wage jobs; 
declining power of unions; lack of universal child care, health care, and 
affordable housing; inadequate education; limited social supports; growing 
income inequality; and discrimination—in sum, “a failure of the economic 
and political structures to provide enough decent opportunities and supports 
for the whole of society.”409 
Danieli Evans Peterman highlights a range of discriminatory practices 
based on socioeconomic status, writing, 
Employers screen applicants by residential address and weed out 
people who live in notoriously poor neighborhoods. Municipalities 
enact zoning rules for the purpose of excluding low income 
residents. Schools place wealthier students in more advanced 
classes with more experienced teachers. States require voters to 
show identification documents that poor people have more 
difficulty obtaining.410 
Technology can make each of these forms of poverty discrimination even 
easier. Employers can use screening services to weed out low-income people 
from the pool of job applicants. Credit scoring algorithms can lead banks to 
deny loans to low-income people, thereby entrenching zoning disparities. 
Public school placement algorithms can favor technologically sophisticated 
and wealthy parents. Algorithms can be used to gerrymander districts in ways 
that dilute votes of poor people and people of color. 
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408. ICELAND, supra note 43, at 125–30. 
409. Rank, supra note 403, at 19.  
410. Peterman, supra note 74, at 1286. 
 
428 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
 
Furthermore, social media is feeding adverse stereotypes about poor 
people to the gatekeepers of important social resources, such as employers 
and loan companies. While wealthier people can hire reputation management 
services to clean up their online profiles, poor people are left with a “tarnished 
mark” that “undermines their economic and educational opportunities and 
reinforces social gaps.”411 Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad identify 
various “[d]igital marks of shame,”412 such as obesity and tobacco use that 
are strongly correlated with poverty but that previously might have remained 
invisible to these gatekeepers and the general public.413 Today, these are traits 
that employers are tracking through applicant screening services, wellness 
programs, and other surveillance technologies. As a result, employers may be 
tempted not to hire, or to fire, certain low-income workers to save on health 
insurance costs. Further, people face inferences not only from their own 
social media posts but also from data gleaned from their social media 
“friends,” which feeds into their digital profiles.414 Their friends’ habits and 
preferences are used to make predictions about their conduct. For all these 
reasons, a right to be forgotten could help low-income people move past 
negative inferences generated from their economic status. 
In the United States, we punish the poor, but we also share certain cultural 
norms about starting anew that are associated with “the immigrant, pioneer 
histories of so many Americans” and our individualistic ethos.415 We see 
these norms reflected in various settings. For instance, in the justice system, 
character evidence is generally inadmissible in trials because of a bedrock 
legal principle that people should be judged by their actions and not their past 
conduct or personality traits.416 We also provide people with fresh economic 
starts through bankruptcy, which allows people and companies to eliminate 
their debts and begin again with a clean slate.417 To bolster this financial fresh 
start, credit reporting agencies cannot include data about bankruptcies after 
seven to ten years (depending on the form of bankruptcy filed),418 and 
employers cannot discriminate against employees who have declared 
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bankruptcy.419 FRCA likewise requires erasure of arrests, civil lawsuits, and 
legal judgments in credit reports after seven years.420 These measures are 
designed to limit the stigma associated with bankruptcy and other interactions 
with the justice system. The United States should follow the lead of the 
GDPR and expand the right to be forgotten beyond these narrow contexts. 
Some commentators contend we should forget about a right to be forgotten 
in the United States because it is barred by the First Amendment.421 However, 
the First Amendment has never been absolute, particularly with regard to 
private, commercial relationships.422 For instance, the privacy torts of public 
disclosure of private facts, invasion of privacy, and defamation do not run 
afoul of the First Amendment.423 Similarly, as Neil Richards explains, data 
privacy laws are constitutional because they pose no “menace [to] a free 
press,”424 which is accorded higher levels of protection than private speech. 
Thus, we have perfectly constitutional laws that aim to keep private our 
health records and financial information. Frank Pasquale adds that search 
results are “a matter of algorithmic data processing, not personal (or even 
corporate) expression,” and thus entitled to even less constitutional 
protection.425 Any right to be forgotten in the United States will not be a carte 
blanche right to shape one’s internet profile in false or misleading ways, and 
certainly not to limit or erase reporting by journalists, but it will require 
balancing the public’s interest in information with an individual’s right to 
privacy. 
Criminal records are a prime example of why the right to be forgotten is 
so important to marginalized communities. In America, one-third of the 
population has a criminal record due to aggressive mass criminalization 
policies that particularly impact people of color.426 These records generate 
 
419. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (2018). These protections, however, do not apply to private employers’ 
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collateral consequences that limit people’s access to employment, education, 
and housing, as well as impact parental rights and freedom of movement—
of all which undermine any vision of economic justice.427 Accordingly, all 
states have passed expungement laws, which allow people to apply to have 
certain criminal records either deleted from official public databases or 
marked as “expunged.”428 These laws are designed to provide people with a 
“clean slate,” so that they can obtain jobs, housing, and other life necessities 
“which in turn will reduce social and economic hardship for individuals, 
families, and society.”429 
Expungement laws, however, are undermined by data mining, particularly 
the buying and selling of personal data for background check purposes. Once 
a data broker collects a criminal record from a public database, that data lives 
on in cyberspace.430 People must play a frustrating game of whack-a-mole, 
constantly trying to clean up stale data where it emerges. Yet, it can be 
impossible to know where expunged data is being reported, and even armed 
with that knowledge, the FCRA process to correct such information in 
consumer reports is cumbersome and difficult.431 Moreover, data brokers 
often evade FCRA’s reach.432 Thus, a right to be forgotten that allows people 
to demand digital expungements—or that limits release of criminal non-
conviction records in the first instance433—could enhance our existing 
expungement laws and expand access to life necessities and economic 
security for millions of Americans. 
Notably, the GDPR treats criminal records as a specially protected class 
of data, providing that “[p]rocessing of personal data relating to criminal 
convictions and offences” can happen only under governmental control or 
laws that ensure safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects.434 In 
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the EU, it is not necessary to talk about digital criminal records expungement 
because criminal records and defendants’ identities are kept under wraps by 
courts in the first instance.435 Convictions for minor offenses and arrests that 
do not lead to convictions are never entered into the official record.436 Private 
databases of criminal records are illegal.437 Obviously, expungement laws in 
the United States are not as broad, as we have a historical commitment to 
open criminal records.438 Despite this norm, every state has enacted laws to 
limit the long-term impact of certain criminal records and to give people a 
fresh start.439 Thus, a right to be forgotten could help state expungement laws 
achieve their goals. More broadly, the right to be forgotten could ensure that 
the social sorting driven by digital profiling does not become a permanent 
barrier to economic advancement and that data errors and omissions do not 
become fixed in time to the detriment of individuals. 
D. Public Participation 
The GDPR requires public input in certain data privacy programs, and 
similar public participation opportunities should be adopted and expanded in 
American privacy laws. The GDPR’s public participation requirements 
attach to Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs), which are reports that 
data controllers must prepare when they process personal data.440 DPIAs are 
required whenever automated processing, particularly using new 
technologies, “is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of 
natural persons.”441 High risk situations include profiling that has significant 
effects, processing of sensitive categories of personal data (including criminal 
convictions), and large-scale monitoring of public areas.442 A DPIA must 
contain a description of the intended processing and its purposes, the 
necessity and proportionality of the processing, the risks to the rights and 
freedoms of data subjects, and steps and safeguards the controller is taking to 
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protect personal data.443 Significantly for purposes of this discussion, data 
subjects also have a role in the DPIA process: “Where appropriate, the 
controller shall seek the views of data subjects or their representatives on the 
intended processing . . . .”444 The A29WP provides that controllers can obtain 
public views through a variety of means;445 one consultant suggests “focus 
groups, user groups, public meetings, consumer panels, town hall 
meetings, individual interviews, paired interviews, and surveys.”446 The 
A29WP adds that an entity whose final processing decision differs from the 
views of data subjects should document its reasoning.447 
In the United States, debates around comprehensive privacy legislation 
and proposed federal bills have not contemplated public participation. By 
contrast, public participation is a long-standing norm in a wide range of other 
United States laws,448 most prominently in environmental regulation, land 
use, and government programs impacting low income communities.449 
Depending on the statutory regime at issue, participation mechanisms can 
range from the right to speak at a hearing or submit written comments to more 
deliberative and collaborative settings, such as small group meetings, 
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Multiple theories of democracy support public participation in 
policymaking. To begin with, decision-making is arguably improved when it 
includes the perspectives of people most impacted, who can provide needed 
information and novel problem-solving ideas.451 In technical and scientific 
realms, public participation can infuse a values-oriented perspective into 
decision-making that might otherwise be overshadowed by technocratic 
approaches.452 Public participation is also touted as a way to build legitimacy 
in regulatory regimes because people gain trust from processes they 
understand and shape.453 A separate strand of participatory democracy theory 
focuses on benefits to impacted communities as they gain political and social 
skills though participation in civic life, along with enhanced dignity and self-
respect.454 At bottom, public participation is “anchored by the democratic 
values of political equality and popular sovereignty which are thrust upon the 
republican form of government.”455 
Privacy shares similarities with both the environmental and anti-poverty 
realms. As with the environment, data privacy involves tensions between 
corporate objectives and the public interest, with oversight by government 
actors who are subject to regulatory capture. Like natural resources, privacy 
is an integral resource for human flourishing—but once stripped, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to regain.456 Moreover, the looming dangers of 
climate change and surveillance capitalism are similarly profound. As with 
social welfare programs, marginalized communities are uniquely and 
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harmfully impacted. Yet with regard to data privacy, public involvement is 
not formally part of existing or proposed regulatory schemes. This may be in 
part due to public ignorance over the scope and scale of how technology 
breaches privacy. One international privacy advocacy group reports 
[m]ost consumers still think about online privacy as being primarily 
concerned with the data they share, and not the data that is observed 
from their behaviour, inferred or predicted. It is our experience that 
the general understanding of how profiling works and the kinds of 
information it can reveal is exceptionally low.457  
When privacy scandals have come to light, the public has participated 
primarily through cycles of media-generated outrage, litigation over data 
security breaches, and particularly for low-income communities, through 
small-scale public protests. These are not formalized mechanisms for ex ante 
involvement, but rather, post hoc responses to moments of crisis—which 
could possibly be avoided through participatory mechanisms in data privacy 
regimes. 
The GDPR’s public participation requirement is a modest one, and its 
“when appropriate” caveat is undefined. Nevertheless, it opens the door to 
thinking about how more expansive public participation norms might work 
to enhance American data privacy. To begin with, perspectives of multiple 
stakeholders should be involved in legislative hearings on data privacy, as 
well as behind-the-door meetings and negotiations. To date, most testimony, 
and presumably most lobbying efforts, have been provided by industry 
representatives, with a small sampling of consumer-oriented, non-profit 
groups involved. Elected representatives should invite—and consumer, civil 
rights, and human rights groups should demand—a variety of perspectives in 
the lawmaking process. 
Shaping the laws is a start, but public participation should also be 
incorporated into ongoing data privacy and data security regimes. As 
agencies craft regulations, the public comment process should actively seek 
input from a range of stakeholders, rather than passively waiting for 
comments to be filed. The California Consumer Privacy Act specifically 
calls upon the California Attorney General to solicit broad public 
participation to adopt regulations to “further the purposes of this title,” as 
well as to see if any substantive exceptions and modifications are needed 
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to accommodate changing technologies and other laws.458 This approach 
should be adopted nationwide. It calls for government outreach, rather than 
passive receipt of public comment, which is the bare minimum required for 
regulatory rulemaking in the United States. 
Laws and regulations are a start for public participation, but not the end.459 
At a minimum, similar to the GDPR, the United States should require entities 
that process personal data—both private and governmental—to draft and 
publish impact assessments that reflect input from a variety of 
stakeholders.460 Impact assessments are a regular feature of environmental 
law, which requires government agencies to prepare a detailed assessment of 
the impact of proposed projects, including an analysis of whether certain 
groups will face disproportionate negative consequences.461 Privacy impact 
assessments are required by the E-Government Act of 2002 for federal 
agencies when implementing technology that collects information from the 
public.462 However, they do not require public participation in the drafting or 
post-publication process, and perhaps in part for that reason, the impact of 
these impact statements has been limited.463 
In addition, the FTC and other government agencies at the federal and state 
levels overseeing privacy law implementation should conduct regular 
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surveys and/or focus groups to seek public input on the impacts of data 
privacy and to identify trends and concerns. Prior public surveys have 
revealed that low-income people have greater concerns about their data 
privacy and feel less secure in their ability to manage their data.464 In addition, 
privacy enforcement agencies should hold regular public hearings on 
emerging data privacy issues and include a range of stakeholders. Notably, 
past hearings at the FTC have generated informative descriptions of data 
processing activity along with sound (but unadopted) recommendations.465 
Government agencies should create inclusive consumer and employee 
advisory councils empowered to gather and share information about data 
privacy practices and impacts. Data privacy agencies should also engage in 
public education efforts to inform people about the uses and abuses of their 
data and their data privacy rights and enforcement options. 
Technology can be harnessed for both information gathering and 
educational purposes. The goal should be to engage in an ongoing dialogue 
with the public to ensure that the promise of big data is fulfilled, while 
limiting its more harmful impacts. Through dialogue, society may identify 
certain digital technologies and data practices that should be constrained or 
eliminated outright. For instance, some privacy experts have advocated to 
ban facial recognition technology466 and targeted advertising,467 and sustained 
debate from multiple stakeholders might further shape substantive 
interventions into technological applications that advance economic 
justice.468 
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To be sure, there are many barriers to effective public participation that 
must be addressed to ensure that participation is meaningful, rather than mere 
window dressing. In the 1960s, Sherry Arnstein developed an influential 
“ladder of citizen participation,”469 describing eight levels of participation 
“with each rung corresponding to the extent of citizen’s power in determining 
the end product.”470 At the bottom levels are non-participatory mechanisms 
in which officials talk at participants.471 The ladder then progresses to token 
levels of participation, such as consultation; here, citizens may be heard, but 
they lack the power to shape outcomes.472 At the top three rungs of the ladder, 
citizens gain power “with increasing degrees of decision making clout.”473 At 
the very top, there is citizen control, where “have-not citizens” hold a 
majority of the decision-making seats or even full managerial control.474 
Consistent with the ladder analogy, empirical studies have shown that the 
public has the greatest impact when processes are collaborative and 
deliberative, as opposed to one-way communications, such as testifying at a 
public hearing or submitting a written comment.475 
Another barrier to effective public participation can be the expertise 
needed to master complex scientific and technological issues;476 this has been 
a long-standing issue with regard to public participation in environmental 
law. Data privacy involves complex systems such as machine learning and 
algorithmic operations. Nevertheless, laypeople are certainly able to 
understand how they are being impacted by technology on a daily basis, and 
with some education around digital literacy, can appreciate the unseen hand 
of technological impacts. It is important to recognize the expertise held by 
the public; the key is providing a forum for technical expertise and lived 
 
industry; limitations on the online payday and installment loan industries; algorithmic 
accountability statutes for automated decision-making by government agencies; expanded 
consumer protections against coerced debt (debt accrued by abusers in the name of their victims 
of intimate partner violence); and limitations on employee and student monitoring and 
surveillance. 
469. Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 216 
(1969). 
470. Id. at 217. From the bottom to the top, the rungs are manipulation, therapy, informing, 
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expertise to be synthesized.477 Moreover, data scientists are making strides in 
translating machine learning concepts for non-experts. 
Skeptics of public participation also point to the additional costs and time 
incurred when additional processes are layered onto already complex 
decision-making schemes.478 Supporters counter that long-term costs are 
saved by improved outcomes. Moreover, participation has benefits beyond 
outcomes, as people gain skills and knowledge through the process of 
participation. As people understand the value of their personal data and that 
of their networks, the value of their participation will be heightened. And, as 
people feel more secure about their data, they may be more likely to be 
involved in civic engagement in other areas. In an era of increasing social 
alienation due to technology, it is possible that public participation in 
securing data privacy may bring people together. 
Finally, in any public participation processes, it is essential to understand 
the pitfalls that are magnified for low-income people, whose 
“perspectives . . . may be disregarded due to factors such as race, culture, 
income, and language; a lack of traditional markers of expertise such as 
educational or professional credentials; and a lack of other resources that 
provide influence and bargaining advantages.”479 There are risks that 
superficial participation can generate distrust, while diverting resources from 
other social justice reform efforts, and even make it hard to contest outcomes 
that “carry the presumption of community endorsement.”480 Having a voice 
is meaningless without real power.481 Moreover, “a cosmetic process 
invariably favors those already in power.”482 Accordingly, public 
participation must be sensitive to multi-cultural values483 and look to best 
practices to ensure that it does not further marginalize low-income and 
minority communities. In the realm of the environment, the environmental 
justice movement to combat environmental racism has led to multiple, 
 
477. Gius, supra note 454, at 60–61. 
478. See Roberts, supra note 448, at 324, 339. 
479. Jaime Alison Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Making Participatory Governance Work 
for the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 414 (2013); see also Gius, supra note 454 at 83–84; 
Svitlana Kravchenko, The Myth of Public Participation in a World of Poverty, 23 TUL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 33, 45 (2009); McFarlane, supra note 449, at 914–15; Roberts, supra note 448, at 326, 337–
38 (discussing the dilemma of excluded or oppressed groups). 
480. Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 348 (2009). 
481. Jaime Alison Lee, Poverty, Dignity, and Public Housing, 47 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
97, 135 (2015). 
482. Lee, supra note 479, at 414. 
483. See generally John C. Duncan, Multicultural Participation in the Public Hearing 
Process: Some Theoretical, Pragmatic, and Analeptical Considerations, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
169 (1999). 
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concrete participatory best practices to include and empower marginalized 
populations. These experiences demonstrate that meaningful participation by 
marginalized groups requires a commitment of resources and affirmative 
outreach. People’s lives are being shaped by digital profiling and surveillance 
systems, and in a democracy, they should have a say in how these systems 
operate. 
E. Implementation and Enforcement 
The GDPR involves multiple stakeholders in implementation, as part of 
its “data protection by design” approach, which aims to integrate data 
protection into processing technology, from the design stage and beyond.484 
The GDPR considers privacy as a human right, thereby granting individuals 
certain (non-absolute) rights, such as the right to explanation and the right to 
be forgotten, as discussed previously in this Article.485 Individuals can 
demand their rights directly from controllers, and in cases of noncompliance, 
they can file a complaint with their country’s Data Protection Authority 
(DPA) or go to court and seek compensation.486 Individuals do not shoulder 
the bulk of privacy enforcement. Rather, the GDPR includes a range of actors 
to foster compliance. It is a “collaborative governance” regime, which 
harnesses individual, business, and governmental oversight.487 Thus, third 
parties, such as interest groups and digital rights foundations, can litigate on 
individuals’ behalf,488 and in certain countries, bring cases as representatives 
of the public interest.489 
For their part, data controllers must abide by a variety of proactive 
accountability mechanisms. The GDPR recognizes “that a regulator cannot 
do everything by top-down control, but that controllers must themselves be 
involved in the design of less privacy-invasive systems.” 490 Among their 
obligations, controllers need to adopt and implement data protection 
 
484. GDPR, supra note 1, at art. 25. 
485. See supra notes 307–319 and accompanying text. 
486. GDPR supra note 1, at arts. 77 (right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority), 
78 (right to an effective judicial remedy against a supervisory authority), 79 (right to an effective 
judicial remedy against a controller or processor), 82 (right to compensation and liability). 
487. See generally Margot Kaminski, Binary Governance; Lessons from the GDPR’s 
Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529 (2019).  
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489. Id. at art. 80(2). 
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policies491 and security measures and appoint an independent Data Protection 
Officer to oversee compliance.492 They must communicate in a timely, 
concise and intelligible way with data subjects about the processing of their 
personal data.493 They must report data breaches to their country’s Data 
Protection Authority, as well as to impacted individuals.494 They are 
responsible for GDPR violations committed by their processors, such as data 
centers and cloud providers.495 They must draft and carry out DPIAs when 
their processing of personal data is likely to result in high risk to individual 
interests, and also consult with their country’s DPA when those situations 
arise.496 The GDPR provides that controllers can demonstrate their 
compliance through voluntary certification programs; EU member states are 
expected to issue compliance standards.497 
Government also has a key role through each member state’s DPA.498 The 
DPAs have “investigatory,” “advisory,” and “corrective” powers.499 They are 
charged with gathering information, conducting regular audits, advising 
companies about compliance mechanisms; and creating codes of conduct and 
approving certification methods.500 In terms of enforcement, DPAs can 
investigate individual complaints, halt unlawful processing, and bring legal 
proceedings against controllers and processors.501 Moreover, the GDPR 
contains bite behind its bark—DPAs can impose maximum fines of up to 
twenty million euros or four percent of global annual turnover for the most 
 
491. GDPR, supra note 1, at arts. 24 (responsibility of the controller), 25 (data protection by 
design and default), 32 (security of processing). 
492. Id. at arts. 37 (designation of the data protection officer), 38 (position of the data 
protection officer), 39 (tasks of the data protection officer). 
493. Id. at art. 12(1). 
494. Id. at arts. 33 (notification of a personal data breach to the supervisory authority), 34 
(communication of a personal data breach to the data subject). 
495. Id. at art. 24 (responsibility of the controller); see also id. at art. 4 (defining processor 
as “a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal 
data on behalf of the controller”). 
496. Id. at arts. 35 (data protection impact assessment), 36 (prior consultation). 
497. Id. at arts. 42 (certification), 51 (supervisory authority). 
498. Id. at art. 51 (supervisory authority). These are called supervisory authorities in the text 
of the GDPR but are commonly referred to as Data Protection Authorities. See Chris Jay 
Hoofnagle et al., The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is and What 
It Means, 28 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. REV. 65, 74 (2018). 
499. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 498, at 95. 
500. GDPR, supra note 1, at arts. 57 (tasks), 58 (powers). 
501. A full list of tasks and powers of supervisory authorities is in Hoofnagle et al., supra 
note 498. 
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severe transgressions.502 Proportional penalties “ensure[ ] that even the titans 
of industry will not be immune from enforcement.”503 
Taken together, this bundle of obligations provides “systematic 
accountability”504 that relieves individuals of shouldering the burden of 
enforcement. The GDPR framework is thus similar to the concept of 
technological due process, which scholars, including Danielle Citron,505 Kate 
Crawford and Jason Schultz,506 and Frank Pasquale,507 have proposed to 
encapsulate U.S. constitutional due process values of transparency, accuracy, 
accountability, public participation, and fairness within privacy law.508 These 
scholars have taken due process norms developed to constrain government 
decision-making in an analog world and adapted them to both public and 
private conduct in the digital world.509 They call for enhancing individual 
rights by requiring that people obtain meaningful notice and explanations 
about automated processing.510 They advocate for improved hearing 
processes, along with better training for hearing officers about technology.511 
Further, these scholars advocate for extensive government oversight of 
algorithmic decision-making via regular audits of algorithms for biases, 
inaccuracies, and other unfair methodologies, ideally through partnerships 
with neutral, expert third parties.512 
Importantly, these scholars extend due process beyond the governmental 
context, where it exists as a matter of United States constitutional law, and 
into the private realm, which is particularly appropriate given how 
intertwined governmental and private data collection and processes operate 
and the extensive powers private tech companies currently wield over 
citizens.513 These ideas have been influential. New York City passed a bill to 
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improve algorithmic accountability within city agencies;514 several states 
have considered similar bills;515 and a bill has been proposed in Congress to 
improve accountability through impact assessments and audits.516 The idea of 
algorithmic accountability is to ensure that government agencies and 
businesses self-assess their automated decision systems and obtain external, 
expert review of their algorithms, while providing individuals with 
meaningful due process rights to challenge unfair, biased, or otherwise 
harmful systems. Using GDPR-style enforcement mechanisms—systemic, 
collaborative, and diffuse—to develop digital due process in the United 
States is essential to protecting the rights of all Americans, and particularly 
marginalized groups, who have less voice within the political process and less 
access to legal resources to enforce their rights. 
V. WHAT ABOUT THE CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT? 
The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) went into effect on January 
1, 2019, and it is currently the most robust consumer privacy law in the 
United States.517 Along with the GDPR, it is providing impetus for a federal 
law,518 and its implementation is being closely watched. The CCPA creates 
three core rights for consumers: (1) to know what personal information 
companies collect and share about them; (2) to have personal information 
deleted upon request; and (3) to opt-out of the sale of personal information.519 
In addition, as with the GDPR, consumers are protected against 
 
514. New York City passed a bill to study how city agencies use algorithms; the effort has 
had mixed results. See AI NOW INST., CONFRONTING BLACK BOXES 11–16 (Rashida Richardson, 
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discrimination for exercising their statutory rights. Importantly, it scoops data 
brokers into its coverage.520 
While it enhances consumer control over personal data significantly for 
California residents, it is narrower than the GDPR, and thus provides less 
promise for advancing economic justice. Although it contains a broad 
definition of personal data,521 the CCPA only applies to certain businesses522 
and does not apply to non-profits or government agencies.523 Given the 
regular interaction between poor people and the state, along with the increase 
in automated decision-making by government agencies, this omission is 
significant. Moreover, the CCPA does not provide a right of explanation or a 
right not to be subject to solely automated processing, which create 
opportunities to identify and constrain digital discrimination and exploitation 
while heightening algorithmic accuracy.524 The CCPA does contain a right to 
deletion,525 similar to the right to be forgotten, although businesses under the 
CCPA have broader exceptions from compliance and fewer obligations to 
constrain downstream users.526 In terms of enforcement, individuals can only 
bring private rights of action under the CCPA for data breaches, leaving 
enforcement of the other data privacy provisions to the Attorney General.527 
The CCPA contains a more concrete commitment to public participation than 
does the GDPR, requiring the Attorney General to solicit public opinion in 
crafting regulations,528 but it does not appear to require ongoing public 
participation in monitoring implementation as does the GDPR. The primary 
difference between the GDPR and the CCPA is that the former permits data 
processing only where expressly allowed, while the latter permits it freely 
unless expressly forbidden.529 Thus, to the degree the CCPA is serving as a 
model for Congress and other states, those jurisdictions would be well served 
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to also consider those GDPR-style provisions that could particularly assist 
their low-income residents. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Low-income people in the United States face more serious harms from 
digital profiling than other Americans. Their digital profiles mark them as 
poor and lessen their ability to rent a house, get a stable job, obtain a car loan, 
enroll in college, afford health insurance, or receive adequate medical care. 
Governments are adopting automated decision-making as a gatekeeper to 
social services, but these algorithms often contain inaccurate interpretations 
of law and/or rely on erroneous data, leaving qualified people without sorely 
needed assistance. Surveillance tools, including facial recognition 
technology, are more heavily concentrated in low-income and minority 
communities, stripping people of dignity, ensnaring them in the criminal 
justice and child welfare systems, and undermining their housing stability. 
Currently, neither American privacy laws nor anti-discrimination statutes 
have the teeth to disrupt these digitized patterns of targeting and exclusion 
that keep people in poverty and destabilize communities. Society pays the 
resulting financial and destabilizing costs of incarceration, under-
employment, ill health, and family instability. Accordingly, as Congress 
debates comprehensive privacy legislation, it is imperative that the needs and 
interests of low-income and marginalized communities are part of the 
discussion and considered in crafting solutions. The GDPR, which governs 
data privacy in the European Union, provides a template to spur discussions 
about linking data privacy to economic justice. In the EU, people are entitled 
to explanations about automated decision-making and recourse to human 
decision-makers. They have a right to a digital clean slate to open up future 
economic opportunities. They have some say in the digital regimes that 
govern them, and they have meaningful and systemic enforcement 
mechanisms to secure all these rights. These GDPR provisions alone will not 
eliminate oppression and injustice. However, they provide enhanced 
transparency and accountability to people impacted by digital technologies, 
which in turn, can be building blocks for social justice movements and 
further, substantive reforms. The United States should adopt similar privacy 
law provisions to advance civil rights and economic justice. 
